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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
As a leading producer of seafood in the United States, the 
Commonwealth of Virginia has long maintained an interest in the 
vitality of its private seafood industry. The present study focuses 
on the state's oyster industry which is distinguished for its long 
record of producing one-third of the entire national catch, but which, 
recently has suffered a variety of natural ·and economic setbacks. 
Herein, we.wish to examine the economic value of the subsidy programs 
enacted to meet these recent threats to the ve:r:y ~xiste.nce of the · 
Virginia oyster industry. 
DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAMS - OYSTER REPLETION 
Environmental catastrophes in the form o':E'. MSX disease in: 1960 and 
Tropical Storm Agnes in 1972 have induced a substantive assist to 
oystermen from the public sector. Thus, the Commonwealth's Oyster 
Repletion Program (ORP) is an on-going disaster-relief program 
designed to ~hannel federal and state funds for cultch and reseeding 
to damaged public and private seedbeds. The rationale for public 
investment in this area is three-fold: (1) ORP reflects the option 
demand by the people ·of Virginia (especially seafood lovers and those 
making their living in seafood) for disaster-relief institutions able 
to respond quickly in the event of an environmental emergency, (2) ORP 
represents an in-kind transfer to waterme~ of insurance against 
catastrophic losses, frequently unobtainable in private insurance 
markets, or (3) a redistributive subsidy to assist in meeting the 
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frequently prohibitive cost of such insurance (e.g., flood insurance) 
to entrepreneurs in a sometimes only subsistence-level occupation. 
One primary objective of this study has been to estimate the 
benefit/cost ratio for ORP at the current level of appropriation. In 
addition, while_ the Marine Resources Commission already contracts out 
these seedbed repletion services, we sought to examine the standard 
cost-effectiveness question: given the well-justified need for a 
program of size "X", what is the cheapest was to do it; by contract or 
in-house? Since these two forms of provision are not mutually 
exclusive and may be, at least in part, complementary, a thorough 
answer to the cost-effectiveness question necessitated marginal 
analysis (as to the appropriate size ( "X") of _the contract repletion 
progra,m) and, thus; returned us to estimating demand and measuring 
benefits as required by the primary objective. 
DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAMS - PUBLIC-ROCKS REPLENISHMENT PROGRAM 
Unfortunately, however, not only events of nature have caused 
"c;.atastrophe" in oystering. Oyster seedbeds constitute a classic 
example of an exhaustible, but replenishable, common property 
resource. Economic theory predicts that such a resource will be 
"exploited to exhaustion", as each fishing competitor attempts to reap 
his maximum yield before exhaustion. No entrepreneur has the 
incentive to invest in replenishment activity (even if that simply 
requires less harvesting for n time periods or perhaps just slightly 
less harvesting in every time period), because no· entrepreneur has the 
property right to exclude others from reaping the gains of his 
replenishment. Even with such rights well-specified and carefully 
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assigned to private leasors, the cost of detecting violations may 
itself be prohibitive, and thus the race to exhaustion again ensues. 1 
This classic case of a common property rights externality (see 
Agnello and Donnelly 1975a, 1975b, 1976) was recognized as early as 
1884 by the Baylor survey and subsequently internalized by legislation 
about 1890 identifying all the "best" oyster seedbeds as henceforth in 
the public domain. The rationale for public intervention here was 
well established as the cultch in most deep-water seedbeds was well 
below its optimal heigQt. 2 While implementing one now-accepted 
correction for such a "market failure" by mandating the regulation 
(licensing, leasing) of oyster seedbeds, the turn of the century 
legislation went further and implied an obligation by the Commonwealth 
to sustain yield from the seedbeds withough regard to future 
catastrophic losses (from floods, disease, etc.) or.the subsequent 
. l '· 
cost increases. This legislation co~stitutes, ·then, the original' 
charter to the Virginia MarineResources Commission (VMRC) which 
oversees (in addition to ORP) an on-going seedbed maintenance program, 
the Public Oyster Replenishment Program (PORR).3 
While tµe in-kind subsidy to oystermen has been small (varying in 
recent years between 6% and its current 1-2% of dockside value), we 
sought to focus particular attention on this public investment 
decision as to continuous public oyster rock replenishment. But 
without site-spec{ffic data, it has not been possible to separate the 
;, 
benefits .of on-going replenishment (PORR) from repletion efforts (ORP) 
since throughout the time-period of this study (1967-1976), 
disaster-relief was taking place. Furthermore, not only were the 
benefits and costs of ORP continuously present during 1967-1976, but 
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also, the variation in total subsidy appropriations for the_ oyster 
industry has been dominated over the past ten years by variation in 
the ORP expenditures on disaster-relief. 
Had this not been the case, the benefit-cost ratios across the 
ten years could have generated rate of return information reflecting 
alternative levels of appropriation for replenishment aloneo Instead, 
this study yields primarily conclusions as to the economic value of 
the disaster relief, repletion program so pervasive in recent years. 
Extensive advice in the interpretation of these hybrid benefit-cost 
results is therefore provided in conjunction with proposed extensions 
of the present model and our current recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 2 
AGGREGATE BENEFIT METHODOLOGY 
THE MARSHALLIAN MEASURE OF BENEFITS 
Net benefits from the in-kind transfers conveyed to watermen by 
ORP and PORR consist of two major components: the value to planters 
of the seed oysters above their market price and the net income 
accruing to license/leaseholders of replenished seedbeds. The former 
concept of surplus value reflects total "willingness to pay" and is 
derived ultimately, of course, from the final market value of mature 
oysters. Net benefits to planters are, then, the maximum price they 
OFFER 
would be willing to offer for·a bushel of seed (say, PRICE3, for the 
third bushel) minus the going market price (P~T), summed over all 
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Likewise, capturing the second component of net benefits easily 
identifying the net income of seabed leasors--that is, the difference 
between market value received, P~T' and the outlays (say, MC1, for 
the second bushel on site 1). Again summing over all bushels 
exchanged, ABD (in Figure 2) measures the surplus value to seed 
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Using monthly data, aggregated over seven counties and eight 
water areas, we calculated both net benefit triangles by estimating 
the following simultaneous equations model of the seed oyster market: 
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where the "t" subscript denotes a month between January 1966 and May 
1976 and where 5 
Q~ = quantity of seed oysters demanded 
s Qt= quantity of seed oysters supplied 
P~E = the price of seed oysters 
P~H = the price of shuck ("mature'') oysters 
Di = dummy variables indicating natural or man-made disasters 
with adverse publicity effects' that decrease the demand for oysters 
MONTH DUMMY1 = dummy variables for each of the eight months 
oysters are in season 
= an index of alternative employment opportunities 
Rt = the cost of capital 
p~R = crab price index 
p~L = clam price index 
PSCL 
t = surf clam price index 
At= a biological measure of seed oyster availability 
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SPECIFICATION AND IMPLICATIONS - THE DEMAND EQUATION 
Fishery firms (whether owner-managed or manager-controlled, 
single or multiple employee) are at any moment pursuing both 
profit-maximizing and cost minimizing objectives. Given an optimal 
profit-maximizing decision as to output (here, catch size) harvesters 
of, say, market oysters will proceed to make cost minimizing 
factor/input choices6. They do so, quite intuitively, by equating the 
marginal contribution to the catch of another dollar spent on any 
inputs, be that tongers, vessel equipment, or seed oysters. That is, 
if $75 spend hiring the last crewman increased output/catch by only 60 
bushels/week while an additional $75 spent renting patent tongs would 
increase catch by 100/bushels/week, then the oyster entreprenuer would 
be well advised to lay off the crewman and rent the ton~s. Indeed, we 
can expect and predict this behavior. Now by an axiom of economics so 
universally verifiable that it is proclaimed as a "law"-,-the law of 
diminishing returns--we note that each remaining tonger is, perhaps, 
less crowded and appears more productive and therefore that an 
additional set of patent tongs (perhaps as inventory for quick 
replacement) is of lower marginal product than the previous 
fully-employed sets. 
With some discontinuities, this equilibration process will 
continue until the higher marginal contribution (to the output/catch) 
of the now more scarce. labor per dollar (its marginal physical product 
per dollar is approximately equal to the decreased marginal product of 
the now more extensive capital equipment (MPPcE) per dollar: 
-8-
(2.3) MPPEq/PEQ = MPPTONGERfPTONGER (:MPPLABOR/Wage Rate). 
We can then say that the marginal cost (actually the inverse of 
marginal product per dollar, MPPi/Pi, that is, the additional price or 
cost of one more unit of input, Pi per unit MPPi) of all inputs is 
equal and total costs of the previously-given optimal fishery harvest 
are at a minimum. That is, 
.. OUTPUT OUTPUT OUTPUT 
(2 •4) COST MIN~ (MCBY EQUIP= MCBY TONGERS = MCBY SEED). 
Now, if the final product market for mature oysters is 
competitive, then we can expect each harvester to offer additional 
shuck oysters until his MC of output is just equal to the going market 
. PSH price, MKT" Since, as we have just seen, output can be increased at 
identical cost by adding either more eqt;1ipment, more tongers, or more 
seed oysters, we can analyze any of the intermediate ·product/input 
markets in isolation. That is, an additional twelve bushels of shuck 
(for each of which the harvester receives P:T' say in 1977, $1.25) 
may be supplied at a MC of $15 by simply employing another tonger for 
a day, so in this market structure 
SH 








) ] . 
Thus, if one wants to know what price planters would offer for seed, 
the answer can be obtained by simply rearranging equation 2.5--or, 
more ge~erally, the maximum offer prices/demand curve for different 
quantities of seed may be derived from the maximum offer prices/demand 
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for shuck: 
(2.6) SH PsEED = PMKT X MPPsEED 
The demand for seed oysters is a function of the price of shuck and 
any variables influencing the marginal product of seed in the 
production of shuck, or more generally, any variables influencing the 
production function of shuck oysters. 
In specifying the structural demand equation to be estimated, 
2.1, we identified this all-encompassing shuck price series as the 
primary determinant of seed oyster demand. 7 The final product price 
replaces in equation 2.6 all the usual determinants of fishery demand 
(like income, seafood price indices, market size, etc.), but in 
precisely tracking the. shuck market equilibrium, it encompass~s all 
the information about final product demand better than any more 
extensive group of independent variable possibly could. That is the 
unique nature of the intermediate product/market studied here. In 
addition, we include in equation 2.1 monthly dummy variables to 
reflect fish population dynamics and other time-related vagaries of 
the oystering business like weather, salinity, temperature, etc.8 It 
would be preferable to have direct observations on fishery stocks 
("availability") and the other catch parameters, but in the absence of 
that information, monthly dummies will capture any seasonal patterns. 9 
Finally, we insert disaster dummies into the specification of equation 
2.1 to represent major structural changes (in the relevant aquatic 
ecosystems) which might adversely affect the production or the price 
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of shuck seed/oysters and, thus, the MPPsEED (in equation 2.6). 
While the a priori relationships between the month dummies and 
seed quantity demanded are better known to those marine biologists 
studying the shuck oyster production function en vivo, we can predict 
an unambiguous negative sign for the adverse publicity about 
environmental contamination precipitated by the extensive flooding 
followi~g Tropical Storm Agnes.IO In addition, of course, because of 
massive salinity changes, flooding and ecological disasters in general 
adversely affect both the seed and shuck production functions and, 
thus, both seed quantitiy supplied and (through MPPsEED in equations 
2.3 to 2.6) seed quantity demanded.11 This latter implication, one 
should ~ote, reinforces the adverse publicity effects captured by the 
disaster variable. in equation 2. 1_ (the demand equation). Finally, b 
SH equation 2.6, we expect the sign on PMJ.(.T to be positive and, by "the 
iron law of demand," that on PsEED to be negative. 12 
SPECIFICATION AND IMPLICATIONS - THE SUPPLY EQUATION 
In specifying a structural equation for fishery supply, one is 
overwhelmed not by the paucity but by the profusion of possible supply 
shifters. In theory, the cost of producing seed oysters is a function 
of (1) factor/input prices (here, the interest rate on marine 
equipment, the wage rate paid to tongers and the price of cultch 
material--usually shells), (2) tpe biological fertility of fragile 
aquatic ecosystems and (3) the price of alternative seafood products 
which oystermen might easily supply.13 As above, the price of inputs 
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appears in the seed supply function because seed oyster firms will 
cost-minimize by equating the marginal contribution per dollar·of 
capital equipment (i.e., CE), tongers, and cultch material to the seed 
harvest: 
SEED (2.7) 1/MCouTPUT SEED - MPPTONGER/W SEED = MPPsHELLs/PsHELLSl 
where Rand Ware the relevant interest rate and wage rate. With 
again a competitive market structure, this time in the factor market, 
no particular supplier can withhold enough seed to permanently 
influence the terms of exchange so the schedule of minimum asking 
prices (i.e., the supply curve for seed) is the cost-minimizing MC 
schedule. Thus, 
SEED · (2.8) PASKING = MC(;g(QsEED)) = R/MPPcE = W/MPPL = PsHE:r.,L/MPPs) 
or, by the inverse function rule, 
Capital costs to oystermen "R" are widely dispersed because 
collateral seldom extends beyond the vessel to be purchased and 
because small-scale watermen are notorious for keeping almost no 
record of their week-to-week operations. Thus, the default risks 
avoided by creditors can not be properly estimated from actual data. 
Bankers do not revel at this kind of uncertainty, and thus, watermen 
either establish very solid, long-term reputations in a community or 
they are• quoted prohibitive capital costs. In order to reflect this 
phenomena, we pursued a monthly interest rate series with a "lender of 
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last resort," the Federal Land Bank Association, but found that 
despite (perhaps because of) the informational deficiencies, local 
banks handled the great majority of loans to watermen.15 Thus we have 
adopted various Virginia interest rate· series beginning with the AA 
bond rate. 
The local wage rate paid crewmen in oystering "W" is not directly 
observable. In fact, the Virginia Employment Commission (VEC) 
disaggregates their published data no further than all fish species 
which are, unfortunately, also lumped with forestry and agriculture. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to take observations on the most 
significant determinants of "W" and allow these proxies to stand in 
for the theoretically indicated variable. Beyond "agriculture, 
forestry, and [other] fishing," the predominant alternative employment 
opportunity for oystermen throughout the sample area is home 
construction, usually in the unskilled, non-union jobs.16 After 
calculating county specific weights based upon the VMRC's 1974 and 
1976 employment counts of "casual oystermeri on boats and shore plus 
crewmen on vessels" (see Table 1), we constructed two weighted average 
wage/employment indices for these mobile oystermen (one for 
construction, as defined by the VEC and the other for agriculture, 
forestry, and fishing).17 
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SAMPLE AREA: SELECTED OBSERVATIONs18 
Agriculture, 
Weights: Forestry, 
Percentage Construction Manufacturing and Fishing 
County/City of Mobile Earnings /Wk Earnings/Wk Earnings/Wk 
of Residence Oystel;lllen Jan-June'76 Jan-June'76 Jan-June'76 
Gloucester 31% $131 $101 $280 
Accomac 26.75% 144 121 142 
York 11.85% 188 283 124 
Mathews 10.35% 128 148 105 
Northampton 6% 166 114 239 
Isle of Wight 6% 197 217 79 
Newport News 6% 213 226 139 
Sources: Marine Resource Commission, "1976 Data Run", and Employment 
Summary Sheets, 1974-1976; Virginia Employment Commission, 
"Covered Employment and Wages." 
In order to ultimately justify this aggregation across the sample 
area, we must of course show that the .six county (and one city) series 
on wages/employment are highly correlated. Equilibrium employment in 
fishing and thus job choice is established in large part by the 
relative wages in each area (the ratio of oystering to construction 
wages, for example). To the extent that employment opportunities are 
comparable across the sample area (see footnote 16), the relevant 
relative wage rates may differ a great deal (as Table 1 and 2 
demonstrate), but it is only when the ~elative wages change in 
opposite directions that an aggregated, weighted average wage rate in 
construction or manufacturing or oystering will be inappropriate. We 
did examine the simple correlation coefficients between all pairs of 
county-coµnty and county-city indices, as well as those correlations 
between each individual series and our aggregated Virginia index and 
found them to be positive.19 
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Table 2 












Source: Virginia Employment Commission, Manpower Research Division, 
"1976 Wage Rates and Fringe Benefits for Selected Occupations 
Paid by Virginia Manufacturers." 
With job or skill distributions not controlled, however, the 
aggregated wage indices take on an ambiguous meaning.20 We can not be 
sure what is implied, for example, by a rise in the aggregate 
construction wage. Does it signify that demand for construction labor 
at all job/skill levels has increased, or does it mean that the skill 
distribution has shifted upward such that there are now more 
engineers, but fewer laborers? In the former case, alternative 
employment opportunities for oystermen (in general, and for casuals 
and crewmen, in particular) have expanded and wage costs in oystering 
will rise, while in the latter case precisely the opposite effect on 
wage costs is implied. Thus, without an unambiguous implication as to 
unskilled wage rates and, through crewmen labor costs, as to seed 
quantity supplied, the construction and other wage indices are 
expendable.21 
We opt therefore for the alternative employment opportunity 
index, which weights, for example, construction engineers and 
construction laborers equally.22 For example, in mid-1967, when 
-15-
Accomac County construction wages fell from $87 at the start of the 
year to $78/week, we would not expect less substitution toward 
construction by watermen, but more, because (in this case) job 
availability was enhanced by an influx of low-paying construction 
openings (from 188 total in January up to 250 in June). And it is job 
availability that induces substitution by watermen. 23 Thus, when the 
construction employment index increases by one, we can infer 
unambiguously that one labor slot opened at the base of the 
construction crew's hierarchical pyramid or, because of the pyramid's 
multipliers, that more laborers will be hired to fill out the crew of 
the one carpenter, foreman, contractor or engineer. 
A final potential problem with even these alternative employment 
indices remains, howver, and that involves the argument that it is not 
the presence of a weighted average job at a higher relative wage that 
induces a crewman to quit (and substitute out of oystering), but 
instead, the presence of a single marginal job opportunity at higher 
wages. That is, our average employment indices assume a job choice 
equilibrium in each county--an equilibrium which is then disturbed by 
an attractive job opening anywhere in the entire sample area. 
Fortunately, the presence of few licensed oystermen in the legal 
jurisdictions immediately surrounding the James River's prolific 
seedbeds verifies just that kind of mobility (from Isle of Wight, 
Surry and James City Counties to the oystering construction arid 
manufacturing jobs in Hampton and Newport News) presupposed by this 
aggregated modelo Thus, as is clear from equation 2.9, we predict 
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that an increase in the interest rate, the price of shell, or any of 
the alternative employment indices will raise capital, shell, or labor 
costs and, by increasing the marginal cost of production, will reduce 
the equilibrium seed quantity supplied. 
Again, examining equation 2.9, we clearly must include in the 
supply specificiation both the month and disaster dummies as they 
reflect important determinants of the marginal product (MPP) of labor, 
shell, and capital in the production of seed. As before, popular 
dynamics and many other seasonal parameters of catch should be 
captured by the Agnes variable plus the eight dummies identifying 
those continuous months during which oysters may be legally landed. 
Our expectation is that at a later date, a biological "availability" 
measure of spatfall counts on shell strings would supplement these 
crude, dichotomous attempts to capture all the critical seasonal 
determinants of a seed oyster production function. 
Finally, we must include those seafood products toward which seed 
entrepreneurs might easily substitute their vessels and equipment. 
Typically, this cyclical pattern of effort in various fisheries can be 
well predicted by the price indices of seafood for which the 
oystermen's boat, gear, and knowledge is complementary--in particular, 
clams and crabs.24 One can easily perceive the theoretical 
implication that leads to this result by noting an analogy to our 
previous discussion about the demand for se_ed oysters. Here, too, the 
offer price by clam or crab buyboats for an input-;--in this case, the 
oyster entrepreneur's knowledge and equipment--is derived from the 
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demand for and thus price of clams or crabs. Hence, PINPUT is again 










(compare equation 2.6). Now, since seed quantity supplied is a 
function of marginal costs and since, with a rise in the price of 
clams, the realizable rate of return (or opportunity cost) on oyster 
capital will increase, we expect the seed quantity exchanged to fall. 
Thus, QsEED and all the seafood price indices of supply substitutes 
(i.e., hard clams, crabs, and surf clams) should be inversely related. 
But why in the specification of the supply equation (i.e., 2.2) 
have we specified separate price indices (for, say, two products as 
similar as hard clams and surf clams), rather than employing an 
aggregated "supply substitute" price index? In general, why is it 
necessary to use disaggregated price series for supply and demand 
shifters, not extensively aggregated price indices? With an 
equilibrium allocation of time to the four species in question (crabs, 
clams, surf clams, and oysters), an oyster entrepreneur does not wait 
around for a change in the price of weighted average clams to alter 
his labor choice. If the price of hard clams rises relative to the 
alternative species, he shifts effort and equipment to harvesting hard 
clams, independent of whether or not the price of surf clams falls 
just enough to offset any rise in an appropriately weighted clgim 
price index. 
Table 3 consolidates all the foregoing information as to the 
-18-
























The specifications detailed in the previous two sections yield an 
estimated time-series model:25 
d (2.11) QtSeed d d d d =a. - B1 PSEED + B2PSHUCK + B:-MONTHDUMMIES t t 3,4,5,6,7,8;9t,10 
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(2.12) Q~SEED s s - BsR - B;PtSHELL - B:CLPit = a. + Bl PSEED 
t 2 t 
- B;scLPit - B:CRPit - B;coNSTRUCEMPLt 
+ BsMONTHDUMMIES - B{6nISASTERDUMMYt - t 8,9,10,11,12, 13,14,15 
+ Vt 
(2.13) Q:SEED = Q:SEED. 
However, because of the simultaneity of equation 2.11 and 2.12, the 
p~EED term in the demand equation feeds back on the dependent variable 
in the supply equation, Q~SEED, and thus, in equilibrium is (by 2.13) 
correlated with the error term on Q~SEED--namely, tit• Since this 
phenonmenon violates the ordinary least squares (0LS) assumption of 
non-stochastic explanatory variables, the .0LS estimators of the slope 
coefficients (the Bs), as well as the t tests for significance, are 
biased and inconsistent. Moreover, even the direction of bias on each 
estimated slope coefficient on PsEED (i.e., B1) is generally not 
predictable, and since the.slope is critical to the estimation of a 
seed oyster demand curve (and thus to our benefit measure), this 
deficiency of 0LS must be remedied. 
EQ. EQ 
As the failure-proof prescription, to predict QsEED or PsEED by 
estimating with 0LS the reduced-form coefficients, will not yield a 
benefit measure, we proceed to estimate both structural equations 2.11 
and 2.12 with two-sta&e least squares (2SLS). The 2SLS method 
employes all predetermined variables as instruments in the 




1st + B1stP + B1stMONTHDUMMIES 
a 1 SHUCK 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 
+ B1stDISASTERDUMMY + B1stR + B1stCLPI 10 t 11 t 12 t 
+ B1stscLPI + B18tCRPI + B115
stcoNSTRUCEMPLt 13 t 14 t 
The predicted values of p~EED from this reduced-form regression are 
then used as an instrument in the two structural (demand and supply) 
specifications containing only relevant explanatory variables (i.e., 
equations 2.11 and 2.12). 
By the order condition that the number of predetermined variables 
ex.eluded be equal to or exceed the number of endodgenous variables 
included minus one, we find both structural equations identified with 
the supply curve exactly identified.26 Since all the month and 
disaster dummies reflect determinants of seed (as well as shuck) 
production costs and therefore influence seed quantity supplied, none 
( 
of th~m can assist in identifying the supply function. While all 
these factors are predetermined and thus may be employed as 
instruments, the identification of the structural supply equation 2.2 
is totally dependent upon the shuck price series. That is, p~HUCK is 
the only exclusively-demand shifter--the only variable in the 
two-equation system which shifts the demand curve but not the 
supply--and as such, only it can unambiguously trace out or "identify" 
the supply curve (see Figure 3). This dependency on only one variable 
to screen out all the accessory influences and identify a clean 
price-supply relation assures a particularly precarious estimation but 
-21-
the variable in question is all-important for input markets, and we 
expected a sig~ificance would be attached thereto and generate 
meaningful estimates.27 Indeed, the second stage regression results 
confirm all hypothisized signs (save that on DISDUMMYst and SCPI) with 
only scattered instances of simply marginal statistical significance. 
Otherwise, the structural equations 2.15 and 2.16 emerge with t-scores 
justifying widespread confidence in the plausible estimates (see Table 
4).28 
Figure 3 
SEED OYSTER MARKET 
SRMC = SSEED OYSTERS 
0 SEED ·:(PSH) = 1.20/lb.) 
= 1.10/lb.) 
DSEED 
.__------.SEED (PSH = 1.05/lb.) 
(PSH = .90/lb.) d,s 
QSEED . t 
One should note immediately that equations 2.15 and 2.16 are 
demand and supply functions and not the curves of interest for our 
benefit calculus. I . Thus, the intercept terms of a downward-sloping 
demand curve and an upward-sloping supply curve are not 28T lbs. and 




(2.15) Q!EED = 28802.6 - 53142.9 P:EED + 20725.7 p:HUCK 
SUPPLY 
(lbs.) (3.09)*** (2.39)*** 
+ BMONTHDUMMIESt 
3,4,5,6,7,8, 9,10 
(all> 3.2 save Jan. and Dec.)*** 
- 24034.1 DISASTERDUMMY: 
(2.65)*** 
d.o.f. = 75 
n.w. = 1.99 
\ 
R2 = .64 
F = 12.79 
s 
(2.16) QSEED = 142126.5 + 215295.4 P:EED - 21.3 Rt 
t 
(1.29)* (0.21) 
- 217,5 CLPit + 182.4 SCPit - 3488.6 CRPit 
(1.75)*** (1.68)*** (2.09)*** 
- 549.4 CONSTRUCEMPLt +/- MONTHDUMMIESt 
(1.35)* (all~ 1.0 save March 
and Nov. - both positive 
and strongly significant) 
+ 27582.0 DISASTERDUMMY: 
(1.13) 
d.o.f. = 69 
D. W. = 2.14 
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2 
R = .67 
F = 10.17 
general, after adjusting for autocorrelation with the Hildreth-Lu 
procedure (rho= 0.12), the demand estimation was very attractive.30 
Indeed, we have had little apprehension about proceeding to a 
calculation of the seed demand curve and its Marshallian consumer's 
surplus triangle.31 
Unfortunately, the case is quite different with respect to 
Marshallian producers' surplus and the supply function in general. 
Given the paucity of identifying variables in the demand 
specification, the 90 percent statistical significance on a positive 
PsEED term was a pleasant surprise.32 The cost of capital, Rt, may be 
significant because our choice of an easily accessible AAA bond rate 
altogether fails to reflect the risk class of loans to watermen. 
While such measurement error is a possibility, we believe otherwise. 
Instead, we suspect capital asset (i.e., boat) replacement is a 
sufficiently infrequent event that capital costs simply do not 
influence the short-run supply of decisions of seed oyster 
entrepreneurs.33 
The positive sign on the surf clam price index indicates that, 
contrary to our a priori implications, this alternative seafood 
product is a complement to, not a substitute for, seed oyster effort. 
This result makes some sense in light of the recent emergence of the 
Eastern Shore's surf clam fishery, since one can plausibly argue that 
the new catch probably 'attracted additional .fishermen (from within and 
without) 'who in their off-season and down-time, tried their hand at 
oystering.34 
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Finally, let us comment on the construction employment index and 
the present methodology with respect to disaster dummies. 
CONSTRUCEMPLt enters as a clearly insignificant determinant of seed 
quantity supplied, probably because of the high collinearity between 
CONSTRUCEMPL and the price of alternative seafood products. That is, 
simple correlation between crab prices and oyster employment 
(documented above for Gloucester County) is just one side of a 
multi-faceted job-choice equilibrium. For a mobile laborer, all data 
bearing on alternative employment opportunities are input into the 
same decision calculus, so one ex post market observation (say, a rise 
in the price of crabs) is as likely a conveyor of that initial, 
exogenous shock as any other (e.g., a fall in construction as well as 
oystering employment). Technically, multicollinearity causes the 
standard errors of both collinear variables to "explode," thereby 
eroding t-scores and diminishing the chances of each for statistical 
significance.35 
Although the disaster dummy in the demand function performed its 
role of reflecting adverse publicity effects as expected, our 
investigation of supply-related disaster phenomenon has been 
eye-opening. The positive sign on DISDUMMYl suggests that one might 
pursue a distinction between the biological impacts of an ecological 
disaster (which we hypothesized to be adverse) and the massive in-kind 
subsidies proffered by public sector disaster relief. The latter 
phenomenon (here, the importation of seed oysters and shell to replete 
public and private beds damaged by the post-Agnes floods) may be 
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adequately reflected by a structural change dummy (separating the 
sample into pre-Agnes and post-Agnes time periods). Such an argument 
accounts for the positive sign on our qualitative disaster variable, 
which is of this structural change variety. 
The biological phenomenon, on the other hand, would be perhaps 
better reflected by a single life-cycle dummy or a continously 
decomposing dummy. The same is true for the continously declining 
shock of adverse publicity effects following an ecological disaster, 
despite the predictable behavior of a structural-change disaster dummy 
in our demand function.36 While we have, in general, much less 
confidence in the structural supply parameters (than in those of 
equation 2.15), the supply R2 of 0.67 is higher than that for the 
demand equation, and the postivie PsEED term in 2.16 is marginally 
I 
significant. Thus, we proceed to calculation of net consumer and 
producer benefits from the Virginia seed oyster subsidies. 
AGGREGATE BENEFIT ESTIMATES 
Recalling the graphical measure of net consumers' and producers' 
benefit or "surplus" illustrated in Figure 1 (a fascimile of which is 
reproduced below), note that the tetrahedron OCBQ~T is easily 
calculated, by integrating under the now-known demand curve from zero 
to Q~T' the remaining triangle ABC is, indeed, an estimate of the 
value of seed oysters above what planters pay at the going market 
price, P~T• Similarly, if one integrates under the now-known supply 
curve from zero to Q~T and nets these costs OBQ~T of market value 
OABQ~T' then the remaining triangle ABD is a reflection of net income 




















But we do not know the demand and supply curves as yet, for we 
have estimated the demand and supply functions. To reduce the 
estimated equation 2.15 to demand curve which shifts with the 
exogenous parameters of 2.15, we need to construct the two-dimensional 
(price-quantity) intercept "a" for the representative month when - . 
market oysters are at their representative price.37 Thus, we obtain 
whicm. for equation .. 2 .15 begins -
where Mit is the monthly mean of 
exogenous variable i in year t 
An illustrative reduction from 2.15 to the representative monthly 
demand curve for seed oysters in FY 1976 yields an equation for the 
line 
(2.18) Q~EED = 153,799 lbs. - 53,143 PsEED 
(in lbs) (in deflated 1967 $) 
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Now OCBQ~T' that tetrahedron measuring gross "consumer" benefits 
or total willingness to pay, is obtainable by integrating under the 
demand curve 2.18 from Oto Q~T.38 That is, if qSEED =a+ B pSEED, 
the pSEED = -a/B, and thus in general 
Gross "Consumer" 
Benefits_ 
(2.19) G:i:-oss "Consumer" Benefits_ -a/B QEQ + l/2B Q~Q' 
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With this derivation (2.19) plus the estimated parameters of the 
seed oyster demand function (2.18), it is now possible to calculate 
the gross consumer benfits attributable to the. seed oyster subsidies 
for any given month from January 1966 to May 1976.39 Table 5 shows 
these gross benefits aggregated to fiscal years. 
Table 5 
GROSS CONSUMERS' BENEFITS (DEFLATED, 1967 DOLLARS) 
FY 1967 $1,434,248 
FY 1968 1,467,856 
FY 1969 1,211,752 
FY 1970 1,084,800 
FY 1971 1,319,336 
FY 1972 1,263,728 
FY 1973 1,049,664 
FY 1974 1,119,736 
FY 1975 928,856 
FY 1976 1,553,000 
To obtain net "con.sumer" benefits or excess willingness to pay, 
we simply reduce Table 5 by the market value of seed oysters OABQ~T 
for each time period. The remaining triangle ABC measures the 
"consumer" surplus associated with Virginia seed oysters and, thus, 
with the VMRC's replenishment and repletion program (see Table 6). 
Table 6 
CONSUMER SURPLUS (NET CONSUMER BENEFITS) 
FY 1967 $530,675 
FY 1968 528,396 
FY 1969 405,296 
FY 1970 377,137 
FY 1971 510,935 
FY 1972 522,617 
FY 1973 201,239 
FY 1974 -65,917 
FY 1975 238,883 
FY 1976 555,700 
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Finally, a re-estimation of the supply function (2.16) excising 
all insignificant exogenous variables, 40 
(2.16b) QSEED = 111958.7 + 176216.7 PSEED 
t t 
(2.37)*** 
-/+ MONTHDUMMIESt - 3047.3 CRPit 
(all <1.5 save (2.27)*** 
March and Nov. 
- both positive 
and strongly 
significant) 
- 220.1 CLPit + 151.1 SCLPit 
(2.25)*** (1.59)** 
- 359.6 CONSTEMPLt' 
(3.30)*** 
d.o.f. = 73 
D.W. = 2.08 
R2 = 0.66 
F = 11.44 
yields an equation for the linear supply curve of seed oysters in a 
representative month in FY 1975 of 
s PSEED (2.20) QSEED = -248,039.6 lbs.+ 176,216.6 t 
t 
(in deflated, 1967 $) 
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Figure 6 
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Again, we can integrate under the supply curve (2.20), which by a 
fully analogous argument yields producer (i.e., cultivator/harvester) 
costs as shown in Table 7. Net income or Marshallian producer's 
surplus is, in aggregate, then 
Table 7 
ESTIMATED PRIVATE (Producer) COSTs41 
FY 1967 $1,000,272 
FY 1968 924,656 
FY 1969 780,024 
FY 1970 537,096 
FY 1971 758,488 
FY 1972 776,384 
FY 1973 764,848 
FY 1974 9~6,848 
FY 1975 636,280 
FY 1976 840,824, 
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Table 8 
PRODUCERS' SURPLUS (Net Producer Benefits or Net Income) 
FY 1967 $-96,699 
FY 1968 14,802 
FY 1969 26,427 
FY 1970 170,567 
FY 1971 49,913 
FY 1972 -35,276 
FY 1973 83,583 
FY 1974 218,807 
FY 1975 53,696 
FY 1976 156,471 
simply total market value, OABQ~T' minus total costs OBQ~T• Table 8 
presents these results for annual data. Summing net "consumer" and 
producer benefits as in Figure 7, we obtain a measure of the total 
benefits OCB to seed and shuck oystermen of the Virginia 
seed/oyster/subsidy programs (see Table 9). 
C 
EQ A 
p~llCT = $1. 75 
Figure 7 
SUBSIDIZED SEED OYSTER MARKET 
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Table 9 
AGGREGATED NET BENEFITs42 
FY 1967 433,976 
FY 1968 543,198 
FY 1969 431,723 
FY 1970 547,704 
FY 1971 560,848 
FY 1972 487,341 
FY 1973 284,822 
FY 1974 152,890 
FY 1975 292,579 




AGGREGATE COST METHODOLOGY· 
Since any single generation of seed oysters requires little or no 
maintenance expenditures, the time st.ream of costs incurred when 
deciding to replenish a particular seedbed is very short 
(approximately one year) and discontinuous from planting to harvest.43 
To analyze this time stream of outlays correctly requires a 
discounting of the appropriately isolated harvesting expenses. Thus, 
"costs" in economic analysis refer not to the outlays themselves, but 
to the opportunities foregone when expenses are incurred. Timing is 
all-important. A dollar contracted to be paid out a year from today 
necessitates that one begin foregoing less than one dollar in 
alternative consumption/investment opportunities. That is, I need not 
save (and therefore sacrifice the spending power of) a dollar today to 
make a dollar outlay one year from now. Instead, 91¢ saved/invested 
at 10 percen~ interest will generate one full dollar by a year from 
now when the outlay is due. Thus, if a discount rate of 10 percent 
were found to be appropriate, the present cost of a dollar in 
•harvesting expenses to be incurred a year from now is not $1.00, but 
91 ¢• 
Unfortunately, it has not been possible to examine carefully the 
planting versus harvesting costs and to perform an appropriate 
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discounting of the latter.44 This deficiency is ameliorated, however, 
by two consider~tions: first, the acceptance of nominal line-item 
harvesting costs versus discounted expenditures is of less consequence 
with as short a time-stream as is relevant here; and, second, public 
harvesting (which only occurs during repletion transplanting of seed) 
represents a small part of the oyster subsidy programs. On both 
scores, then, this overstatement of costs is relatively minor. 
A possibly more serious bias results from the fact that following 
a disaster, the VMRC does plant cultch material on private as well as 
public oyster grounds, but the replenishment tax data on which our 
benefit estimates are based reflect public and private havesting on 
public seedbeds only. Since site-specific expenditure data employing 
the private versus public-bed distinction also is not readily 
available, we have been forced to include in our program cost 
calculations some VMRC expenditures the benefits of which our model 
does not capture. In that sense, the cost figures do unquestionably 
reflect an overestimate of the first choice benefit-cost measures. 
To preserve some congruency with these benefit estimates 
generated by·tax data on all public seedbeds, we aggregate repletion 
and replenishment costs statewide as exhibited in Table lOA. Total 
VMRC administrative costs are also depicted, as the on-going 
replenishment and disaster-relief repletion institutions are 
inseparably intertwined. Nevertheless, we are inclined to argue that. 
these administrative expenditures and other possible imputations (like 
the law enforcement costs of patrolling the oyster beds) are 
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non-marginal overhead. Since we expect neither administrative nor law 
enforcement pers_onnel or equipment would be cut back if · the oyster 
subsidies were even substantially reduced, these costs are (from the 
perspective of replenishment and repletion budgeting) non-avoidable 
and should not therefore be attributed to the oyster 
Table lOA 
TOTAL DEFLATED COSTS OF REPLENISHMENT (1967 Dollars)45 
Fiscal Year Operating Shells40 VMRC Administrative 
1967 417,404 305,004 62,432 
1968 520,250 481,605 64,953 
1969 340,830 200,905 67,700 
1970 272,932 244,445 72,975 
1971 361,045 344,693 79,500 
1972 322,705 163,364 75,699 
1.973 412,811 322,705 69,083 
1974 333,129 370,594 77,655 
1975 253,771 473,253 63.523 
1976 425,522 105,949 63,000 
subsidy program.47 The Engineering Office of the VMRC Law Enforcement 
Division seems to present something of an exception in its role of 
continuously surveying and charting the oyster beds.48 
BENEFIT-COST RATIOS, NET BENEFITS AND INTERNAL RATES OF RETURN 
As we se~ it, the call for a benefit-cost analysis of oyster 
subsidies has arisen for the following reason. Prior to the 
mid-1970's, a crude proxy for benefits--namely, the market value of 
the seed harvest--seemed to provide a thorough-going rationale for the 
Virginia oyster subsidies in that market val~e always far exceeded 
program costs. Since 1973, however, that Market V~lue/Total Public 
Cost ratio has been close to and, at times, iess than one. That is, 
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program expenditures ODEQ in fiscal year 1975 actually exceeded the 
market value of the entire harvest of seed oysters OABQ (see Table lOB 
and Figure 8). 
Figure 8 
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MARKET VALUE/STATE COSTS RATIOS 
(Deflated 1967 Dollars) 
Fiscal Year Estimated Market Value State Costs Ratio Once-Lagged Ratio 
1967 903,570 722,408 1.25 
1968 939,458 1,001,855 0.94 1.30 
1969 806,453 541,735 1.36 0.80 
1970 707,664 517,377 1.37 1.31 
1971 808,398 705,738 1.15 1.15 
1972 741.110 486,069 1.52 1.05 
1973 848,427 740,939 1.14 1.74 
1974 1,185,652 703,723 1.68 1.56 
1975 689,976 727,024 0.94 0.98 
1976 997,296 531,471 1.88 1.37 
That result is somewhat attenuated by recognizing the biological 
fact that state subsidy costs this year impact primarily upon seed 
output next year (due to the single-year lifecycle from spat set to 
seed oyster harvest). A one-year lagging of the state expenditures in 
Table lOC demonstrates this point as the 50% increase in real (price 
deflated) subsidies from FY 1972 to FY 1973 generates a substantial 
. increase in estimated market value in FY 1974. But market 
value/public cost ratios are subject to criticism on more fundamental 
grounds. In the economist's sense employed here, neither "welfare 
gains" (Le;, net benefits) nor net costs include any measure of the 
market value of the seed oysters OABQ, because it is argued there was 
an~ exchange. The planter/buyers gave up spending power on 
alternative goods and services in an amount just equal to the going 
market value of the seed received. Thus, only the net income realized 
by tonger/harvesters from that exchange (i.e., MK1 VALUE OABQ - COSTS 
OBQ = NET INCOME OAB) is counted as a "welfare gain" to producers. 
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Quite appropriately, therefore, a potentially more enlightening . 
question has now been asked--namely, "Does the welfare gain to shuck 
oystermen and seed oystermen from a viable seed oyster market justify 
the massive repletion and replenishment subsidies?" This question 
necessitated a more sophisticated analysis than could be accomplished 
with simply a market value measure of benefits because the "welfare 
gain" in question is an attempt to capture (1) the excess willingness 
to pay (above equilibrium price) of planters as well as (2) the net 
income of tonger/harvesters. Indeed, such measures of consumer's and 
producer's surplus required the estimation of demand and supply curves 
(as described in Chapter 2), so we can now ask "Does the consumersf' 
surplus triangle ABC (see Figure 9) plus the producer's surplus 
triangle OAB delineate sufficient benefits to justify the subsidy 
ODEQ? 
For this to be so, an appropriately defined benefit-cost ratio 
must be greater than one. Accordingly, the aggregate net benefit (OAB 
+ ABC) to state cost (ODEQ) ratios are exhibited in Table 11.49 
Alternative reflections of this same information also appear in Table 
11 as internal rates of return, which we define in the present context 
as follows: 
SUBSIDIZED PRIVATE ROR = [NET INCOME (OAB)/PRIVATE COSTS (OBQ)]-1.O 
PUBLIC (STATE) ROR:: [NET INCOME+ CONSUMERS' SURPLUS/PUBLIC COSTS (ODEQ)]-1.O 
From the legitimately narrow perspective of a state budget 
' allocator, these benefit-cost results indic_ating (for the most recent 
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year) an excess of total economic value over cost of _34 percent are 
valid and final as they stand. 
Table 11 
BENEFIT-COST RATIOS AND INTERNAL RATES OF RETURN 
Fiscal Year B/C Ratio Public (State) ROR Private ROR 
1967 0.60 -40% -177% 
1968 0.54 -46% 87% 
1969 0.80 -20% -73% 
1970 1.06 6% -254% 
1971 0.80 -20% -47% 
1972 1.03 3% -136% 
1973 0.38 -62% -13% 
1974 0.22 -78% 181% 
1975 0.40 -60% -32% 
I 1976 1.34 34% 149% 
But recent federal subsidies to expand the post-Agnes disaster relief 
have been quite substantial, amounting to better than a third of a 
million dollars in only five years. While the opportunity cost to the 
state in terms of alternative federal funding foregone may indeed be 
zero, these federal funds allocated to oyster do, nevertheless, 
reflect real resources not available elsewhere, and thus their cost 
should not be totally ignored.SO Accordingly, a full-cost analysis of 
the net benefit from oyster repletion and replenishment is provided in 
Table 12. 
Table 12 
BENEFIT-COST RATIOS (Federal Funds Included)Sl 
Fiscal Year State Cost Federal Cost52 B/C Ratio 
1967 722,408 65,130 0.55 
-1968 1,001,855 26,549 0.53 
1969 541,735 43,669 0.74 
1970 517,377 45,830 0.97 
1971 705,738 44,563 0.43 
1972 486,069 42,955 0.48 
1973 740,939 59,477 0.26 
1974 703,723 65,214 0.17 
1975 727,024 60,606 0.28 




ON INTERPRETING BENEFIT/COST RATIOS 
Benefit-cost ratios provide an easy-to-understand encapsulation 
of the economic value of a public program, relative to its nominal 
resource costs. Such evaluative information can thus provide the 
decisive input into public policy decisions as to program retention 
and development. Immediate qualifications must, however, be delivered 
in order to ensure a valid interpretation of the results presented in 
Tables 11 and 12. One must, that is, thoroughly understand the limits 
of cost-benefit data and take appropriate care in their application. 
Initially, let it be noted that no particular year (recent or 
distant) can be adequately representative of the subsidy program as a 
whole. Unique circumstances do occasionally dominate any market 
(subsidized or otherwise) and annual snapshots of "reality" may 
therefore obscure the fundamental balance of demand and supply forces 
in a morass of transitory detail. Thus, for example, despite the most 
recent B/C ratio demonstrating a 34 percent excess of benefits over 
costs, in 1973 the market value of seed oysters ABCO (in Figure 9) 
actually outstripped the total private willingness to pay FGCO by 
$65,519. Tliis 1973 anomaly of a negative consumer surplus resulted 
from the MRC's extensive intervention on both sides of the seed market 
in response to the devastation by Tropical Storm Agnes. Seed supply 
costs had decreased (re: the shift downwards of the supply cu~ve from 
So to 81) following a massive public invest~ent in seed and cultch 
replenishment begun the previous season. In addition, with the 
backing of special state and federal appropriations, the VMRC entered 
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the market in 1973 to acquire seed for the continuance of this massive 





















The net effect of the VMRC action appears to have been that seed 
price remained almost unchanged from 1972, but the quasntity exchanged 
practically doubled. Graphically, the market value rectangle ADEO 
expanded substantially to the right (re: ABCO) as both demand and 
supply shifted in that direction. However, as the benefits captured 
by our present model reflect only private willingness to pay (i.e., 
the area under DPRIVAT;E5, note that under e2cpanded DTOTAL (PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE)?, the seed consumers' gross benefits OFGC could theoretically 
be less than the total market value of seed purchased by both private 
planters and the VMRC (i.e., OABC).53 In this case, it was154,55 
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While the net income of those receiving benefits on the supply 
side (i.e., the seed harvesters/marketers) was sufficient to offset 
this negative consumer surplus and leave a positive total "net 
benefit" for 1973 in the amount of $17,666, the lesson of 1973 should 
not be missed. A cursory evaluation of the benefit-cost ratios in 
1972-73-74 would have misled a short-sighted investigator to conclude 
that the oyster subsidies in Virginia ought to be abolished. A per se 
indictment of public sector costs greater than benefits (and thus a 
negative rate of return) especially for 1973 is impregnable to 
criticism on narrow grounds. But to apply that one-time B/C result to 
longer-term public policy choices and conslude that the oyster 
subsidies should be abolished would have been to miss the point. In 
1973, it was not that oyster subsidies had outlived their usefulness. 
Quite the opposite; the 1972-74 oyster subsidies were probably 
decisive in the rebuilding of a recently viable industry just 
devastated by the second natural disaster in twelve years.56 The 1.34 
B/C ratio or the most recent year studied (FY 1976) is evidence that a 
longer-term, investment perspective on the massive 1973 subsidies was 
justified. 
ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY COSTS AND MARGINAL ANALYSIS 
The benefit-cost ratio of 1.34 for FY 1976-77 is indicative of an 
internal rate of return of 34 percent, but even this spectacular 
one-year return on "investment" is as meaningless in a vacuum, in 
isolation., as was the anomalous negative return of .1972. Beyond the 
single-year criticism delivered in the last section, additional 
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dollars ought to be invested in the oyster programs only if the 
Commonwealth's ·alternative "investment" opportunities offer lesser 
rates of return. 
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But the allocative use of total benefit/total cost ratios 
implicit above _is strictly applicable not to incremental funding 
decisions among complementary programs, but rather to discrete (i.e., 
non-continuous) and mutually exclusive public investment projects. 
Thus, if the appropriate legislative oversight and appropriations 
subcommittees were considering a new tunnel, ferry, or bridge across 
the lower James River (as depicted in Figure 10), then we might 
validly rank the "no-frills" version of the three projects on the 
basis of their benefit cost ratios and recommend funding the bridge.58 
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However, if the investment choices are not mutually exclusive, as 
is more typicaily the case, then the total benefit/total cost ratios 
will usually not indicate where additional dollars ought to be spent 
or additional budgets rescinded. 59 Suppose, that is, the VMRC was 
considering future cultch replenishment on three sites, Tangier Bay, 
the East River, and the lower James River, and the site-specific 
benefit-cost appraisals yielded results such as those in Figure 11.60 
The emergent policy implication would not be that an additional 
$4,000 ought to be allocated to the East River (even though its B/C 
ratio is clearly highest). Similarly, efficient budget-cutting of, 
say, $16,000 would not be accomplished by ending the Tangier Bay . 
subsidies, even though Tangier Bay does have the lowest B/C ratio of 
1.5 to 1. 
Instead, in each case marginal analysis of incremental budget 
changes would be preferable to discrete project-wide budget changes. 
For example, the fourth thousand dollars in additional funding for the 
East River program does not generate as much benefit (as measured by 
the height of the standardized unit rectangle under DER labelled 4th) 
as does an additonal thousand dollars expended on either Tangier Bay 
or the James River. Also, the last thousand dollars of $16T rescinded 
from Tangier Bay entails a loss of benefits (as measured by the height 
of the rectangle under DTB labelled 16th) much greater than that 
foregone when a first ·thousand dollars is rescinded from either the 
East River or the lower James (labelled 1st). 
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Thus, a welfare maximizing (benefit maximizing/loss minimizing) 
criterion will lead to the equalization of marginal benefits across 
all three programs. If, for example, the demand at one of the sites 
increased, say, because each unit of East River seed was now more 
productive (in the generation of shuck oysters), then the relevant 
marginal comparisons would indicate additional dollars, when 
available, ought to be allocated to the East River as the marina! 
benefits (measured by the height of the rectangles in Figure 12 
labelled +l, +2, etc.) are greater there than the marginal benefits of 
an additional thousand dollars spent at either of the other sites.61 
Thus, the raw B/C results reported in Table 11 can be only 
suggestive of the financial well-being of the oyster subsidy programs 
at any point in time. Nevertheless, in the absence of the 
site-specific data necessary for marginal analysis, the current B/C 
ratio (and the implied rate of return) can provide a guide to 









Less than twenty years ago, the Virginia portion of the 
Chesapeake Bay watershed regularly yielded 25 to 35 percent of the 
entire national supply of shuck oysters. But historical overfishing 
and recent ecological disasters have depleted this fishery to the 
point that today the Virginia catch represents only about 10 percent 
of the national market.62 
For decades, the Virginia Marine Resources Commission has been 
charged with the responsibility of controlling this overfishing and 
more recently has expanded its disaster-relief programs in response to 
the onslaught of MSX disease organism in 1960 and Tropical Storm Agnes 
in 1972. The foregoing benefit-cost analysis has beeri an attempt to 
document the net economic value of these recent VMRC efforts to 
substantially expand the small post-disaster seed oyster harvests. Of 
necessity, therefore, our conclusions and recommendations focus 
primarily upon the oyster repletion program, not upon the on-going 
replenishment program. 
The cost of in-kind subsidies (of seed and cultch) as funded by 
the Commonwealth's repletion and replenishment programs has n~ver been 
in doubt, but prior to the present analysis the other side of the 
ledger was! Thus arose a persistently unanswered question--namely, 
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"What is the benefit attributable to subs:i,dized culch?" Is it simply 
the market value of the culch material itself? Clearly not, for then 
benefits and costs could never diverge. Is it the market value of the· 
seed harvested from public seedbeds? Yes, in part, but we have shown 
that this measure is an underestimate since the full economic value of 
a seed harvest ought to also capture whatever excess willingness to 
pay (above the going, market price) is exhibited by seed buyers. 
In order to delineate this "surplus value" accruing to the 
planter-buyers of the subsidized seed, it was necessary to estimate 
the demand function for seed oysters. Not surprisingly, the most 
significant determinant of seed demand was found to be the going p_rice 
of mature, shuck oysters. Indeed, the most current benefit-cost 
appraisal of these repletion and replenishment programs reveals seed 
benefits 34 percent in excess of costs in large part because the real, 
deflated price of shuck oysters rose in 1976 more than a dollar per 
bushel above its 1970s average. And as shuck prices rose, seed prices 
rose, thereby increasing the net income of seed producer/harvesters. 
Weighting these "producer surpluses" and the previous "consumer 
(planter/buyer) surpluses" equally, we have aggregated the two to 
obtain a full reflection of the economic value of the seed harvest in 
any recent year. These results have been consolidated from Tables 6, 
8, 10 and 11 and are presented below in Summary Table 13.63 
Perhaps the most striking impression created by Table 13 is the 
truly catastrophic nature of the recent ecological disasters in 




Fiscal Consumer Net Total Net State Federal Benefit/State Public Private 
Year Surplus Income Benefits Costs Costs Cost Ratio (State) ROR ROR 
1967 530,675 -96,699 433,976 722,408 65,130 0.601 -39.9% -177% 
1968 528,396 14,802 543,198 1,001,855 26,549 0.542 -45.8% - 87% 
1969 405,296 26,427 431,723 541,735 43,669 0.797 -20.3% - 73% 
I 1970 377,137 170,567 547,704 517,377 45,830 1.059 5.9% 254% \JI 
0 
I 
1971 510,935 49,913 560,848 705,738 44,563 0.795 -20.5% - 47% 
1972 522,617 -35,276 487,341 486,069 42,955 1.003 0.3% -136% 
1973 201,239 83,583 284,822 740,939 59,477 0.384 -61.6% - 13% 
1974 -65,917 218,807 152,890 703,723 65,214 0.217 -78.3% 181% 
1975 238,883 53,696 292,579 727,024 60,606 0.402 -59.8% - 32% 
1976 555,700 156,471 712,171 531,471 10,440 1.340 34.0% 149% 
All figures are price deflated (1967) dollars. 
:1 
the more persistent in its impact upon the Chesapeake Bay oyster 
industry. Even as late as 1967 (at the start of our sample period), 
estimated producer surplus was still negative; indeed, seed harvesters 
in that year suffered net losses approaching $100,000. Indeed, when 
one includes the cost of the public sector's in-kind subsidy OABC (see 
Figure 13), the seed oyster market did not move again into the black 







Recovery from the freshwater deluge following Tropical Storm 
Agnes has been much faster; notice that estimated net income of seed 
producers did nosedive in 1972, but rebounded almost immediately (with 
sizeabl~ gains in both 1973 and 1974). The timely commitment of 
additional state and federal funds for reseeding damaged beds appears 
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I J 
responsible. (Indeed, the deflated budget figures document a 30 
percent increase in state (28%) and federal (38%) oyster subsidies 
between 1972 and 1973.) 
While the publicly provided cultch and imported seed did reduce 
private cost sufficiently that the net income of harvester/producers 
was again positive by 1974, Agnes was no trivial incident in the 
Chesapeake Bay ecosystem. Instead it has taken almost four years for 
the seed oyster market to again display a net benefit/total cost ratio 
greater than one. However, in the most recent year studied, FY 1976, 
the public investment in seed oysters was returning a more than 
respectable 34 percent in net benefits to harvesters/planters (and 
ultimately retail consumers). Thus FY 1976 would seem to have been a 
turning point in the actuarial fortunes and accomplishments of 
Virginia's oyster programs.64 
EQUIPMENT REGULATIONS 
Of course, other causes contributing to the decline in Virginia's 
oyster market share abound. The tax records of the VMRC document, for 
example, the steady decline in the labor force of the Virginia oyster 
industry. Further, the increasing upward asymmetry of the oystermen's 
age distribution suggests that net losses are not occuring randomly in 
all age groups. Instead, the industry is failing to attract new 
entrants in their teens and twenties. Can these trends really be any 
wonder when numerous employment opportunities in manufacturing are 
appearing where there were almost none before (say, in food 
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processing, and now industrial construction, on the Eastern Shore)? 
The nominal net income accruing to seedbed harvesters (and 
probably to shuck oystermen as well) is not only lower on average than 
that available in these alternative employments, but also it is 
significantly more variable. While there is a certain differential 
independence ·characterizing those who make their living at sea, can 
anyone really suppose that oystermen are so much less risk-averse than 
the rest of us that even the exceptional instability of their recent 
earnings stream (see the private ROR column of Table 13) will not 
impact upon their future employment decisions? Perhaps the most 
feasible way to make oystering more attractive and to ensure therefore 
the long-run viability of the oyster industry is to no longer prohibit 
the wide-spread adoption of more efficient equipment. Not only might 
the industry then realize some of the productivity gains which 
twentieth century innovation has allowed elsewhere, but also patent 
tonging and, in some places, dredging equipment would permit a single 
oysterman (or group of oystermen) to diversify, spread their present 
efforts across a greater number of seedbeds and thereby perhaps reduce 
the enormous variability of their income stream. 
Clearly, this institutional change would necessitate careful and 
vigorous action by the Virginia Marine Resources Commission to protect 
against overfishing. However, it would appear that the various marine 
advisory services of the Virginia Institute of Marine Science are 
well-equipped to assist the VMRC in making optimal catch 
determinations of just this sort and that the VMRC possesses the 
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necessary enforcement capability in its law enforcement division. We 
do, therefore, propose that such a regulatory change be given serious 
consideraton, although clearly further research (most notably by 
environmental biologists) is necessary.65 
We make this proposal in full awareness of the status quo inertia 
which such an alteration in the rights attched to an oyster grounds 
lease must overcome. After all, the present rights structure has been 
firmly in place for many decades. But it is precisely this long-term 
regulatory prohibition of new innovations in oystering which has 
contributed to the present difficulty. For, if an industry is forced 
to sacrifice those cost-cutting innovations which occur from time io 
time, it may ultimately find its product prohibitively expensive 
relative to near and distant substitutes alike. Then, not only 
output, but employment within that industry declines. 
And recall that the oyster industry has, at times, been managed 
in the interest of maximizing employment. Whether primary plus 
ancillary employment maximization was the appropriate resource 
management objective in those periods is not in question. What we do 
ask now is whether the Commonwealth ought to continue its traditional 
prohibition of mechanized oystering, when future employment 
opportunities in tonging appear so unattractive to prospective 
entrants. At one time these regulations served to both protect 
against overfishing and to maximize employment; now, however, the 
former rationale has been rendered less necessary,,while the latter is 
false. 
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Again, net income in non-mechanized oystering is both more 
variable and less profitable on average than the ever more numerous 
alternative employment opportunities now open to children of watermen. 
Thus, despite the fact that the resource might continue be managed for 
maximum job slots, the negative influence of, say, patent tong 
prohibitions upon labor supply will continue to contribute to an 
actual decline in the waterman workforce.66 
Further, with the costs of detecting privateers, interlopers and 
gluttonous overfishers having been reduced in recent years with 
aircraft, electronics, and an automated data system, it no longer 
seems necessary to artifically constrain the harvesting productiv~ty 
above a seedbed by requiring manual rather than mechanized equipment. 
PUBLIC OYSTER GROUND LEASES 
Another major group of VMRC regulations directs attention to the 
question of present overfishing. In particular, the leasing of public 
oyster grounds reflects a long-term attempt to specify, assign, and 
enforce individual property rights and thereby avoid the usual 
externalities or "market failures" associated with a common property 
resource. The disucssion which follows is based upon F. H. DeB. 
Harris, "Pareto Optimality, Market Structure and Common Property 
Resources."67, 68 
In the pre-regulatory (i.e. pre-leasing) era, there were costs 
being imposed on all parties without their consen~, in this case not 
because of the usual incomplete specification, assignment, or 
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enforcement of property rights. The situation was worse! Indeed, 
there was a total absence of assignment due to the prohibitively high 
transaction costs associated with policing and enforcing any 
assignment of private seedbed rights. Thus the effective rights 
assignment (as with any such common-property resource) was by default 
and each individual competitor perceived that the appropriability of 
benefits from investing in replenishment was severly attenuated. As 
such, each oysterman consistently misallocated resources towards 
harvesting within the current period in pursuit of a maximum share of 
seedbed output before exhaustion.69 
As demonstrated by Anthony Scott ("The Fishery: The Objectives 
of Sole Ownership ••• ," Journal of Political Economy, April 1955) some 
years ago, however, a resource monopolist with sufficient 
appropriability over time and space would have an incentive to 
internalize the externality resulting from the underproduction of 
replenishment activity. As such, his harvest/replenish production 
decision would come to be based on a comparison of the marginal 
contribution to net revenue of an additional unit of harvesting to its 
discounted marginal cost (i.e., the "marginal user cost"). By 
equating the marginal net revenue and user cost, the resource 
monopolist would maximize the present value of not just the fishery's 
existent resources, but of his entire package of rights (among which 
is included, of course, the right to appropriate the full return from 
replenishment). 
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This self-corrective mechanism has been the predictable result of 
the Commonwealth's historical attempts to assist watermen in reducing 
the transaction costs associated with specifying, obtaining, and 
enforcing their rights to particular seedbeds. Thus, for a minimum 
fee the VMRC's Engineering Division became an inexpensive arbiter of 
border disputes, while the Enforcement Division subsidized that 
policing of the seedbeds necessary to detect lease violations and 
bring the perpetrators to justice. Again, the predictable result of 
assigning effective rights to these small-scale resource monopolists 
has been the virtual termination of overfishing. In that sense, the 
public sector initiatives launched with the Baylor Survey have come to 
fruition. Nevertheless, certain particulars of the present leasing 
institutions lead to correctable inefficiencies. 
One distinctive characteristic of competitive markets which 
serves consumers and, in the long-run, producers particularly well is 
the frequent recontracting made possible by freedom of entry. When 
buyers can take their business elsewhere on relatively short notice, 
sellers have a more or less continuous incentive to engage in 
cost-minimi~ing production and investment decisions. Moreover, if a 
given resource-holder finds he generates less surplus than another 
entrepreneur might, the former owner-manager has a practically 
irresistible temptation to replace himself with the more efficient 
manager, while perhaps. retaining an ownership interest. And 
competitfve markets reveal this information about the transfer 
earnings of all factors of production in a particularly obtrusive 
manner. 
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A variant of these continuous incentives encouraging the 
efficient allocation of land, labor, capital and entrepreneurial skill 
can be introduced, we believe, into the leasing of oyster seedbeds 
without jeopardizing the externality-reducing mechanism offered by 
assigning seedbed rights to short-term resource monopolists. 
According to the production function studies by Dexter Haven and Ivar 
Strand of VIMS, the life-cycle and thus the investment cycle of an 
oyster seedbed is relatively short with few returns carrying much 
beyond two years.70 
Indeed, the speed of the post-Agnes recovery confirms that with 
the appropriate replenishment effort, the turn-around of yield 
statistics can be very quick indeed! Thus, not only the economic but 
also the biological information suggests that one might .induce 
efficient replenishment by seedbed monopolists with a much shorter 
leasing agreement than now exists.71 
We propose, therefore, that the periodic releasing be more 
frequent and that individual lease allocations be open to competitive 
bidding. To allay fears of too precipitous exit and to preserve some 
semblance of the familial division of those leases in the same hands 
for decades, the VMRC might both (1) control the maximum number of 
leases to single and corporate entities and (2) set aside certain 
additional grounds as initially exempt from the competitive lease 
institutions. While more frequent recontracting may erode the surplus 
appropriated by owners of the currently most productive seedbeds, this 
institutional change would do more than perhaps any other to insure 
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the long-term viability of the oyster industry because it would 
stimulate efficient production and investment on the currently less 
productive seedbeds. Coupled with a repeal of some current 
prohibitions against mechanized equipment, more frequent competitive 
leasing of oyster seedbeds might well induce those productivity gains 
the Virginia oyster industry has sorely missed for some time. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Agnello and Donnelly, "The Interaction of Economic, Biology and 
Legislative Forces in the Middle Atlantic Oyster Fishery", Fisheries 
Bulletin, 197 5. 
_________ , "Prices and Property Rights in Fisheries", 
SEJ, October 1975. 
Baker, Garrett, and Strand, "Publicity Effect of 
Pollution-Related to Kepone", Sea Grant Proposal, VIMS, 1977. 
Charbonneau, Joseph J. and Richard Marasco, "A positive Spatial 
Equilibrium Model of Oyster Markets: A Simultaneous Equation 
Approach", Agricultural Experiment Station, Univ. of Maryland, May 
197 5. 
Harris, Fred, "A Competitive Model of Oyster Seedbed Leasing", 
manuscript, Williamsburg, Virginia, June 1977. 
, "On Estimating the Benefits of an In-Kind ----------,-Subsidy Program: Repletion and Replenishment in the Virginia Seed 
Oyster Industry", presented at Virginia Economics Association 
Meetings, Richmond, March 30, 1978. 
, "Pareto Optimality, Market Structure and ---------Co mm on - Property Inputs", Manuscript, Williamsburg, Virginia, November 
1976. 
Haven and Kendall, "Oyster Spatfall on Shellstrings in Virginia 
Rivers", Marine Resorce Information Bulletins, VIMS, 1975 and 1976 
annual summary. 
, Marine Resource Information Bulletin, VIMS 
-=-:,---:--,:-=--,------July 29, .1974. 
---------, "Virginia Landings", NOAA-National Marine Fisheries Service, Summary issue 1970. 
-59-
Scott, Anthony, "The Fishery" The objectives of Sole 
Ownership ..... Journal of Poltical Economy, April 1965. 
-60-
FOOTNOTES 
lnifferential detection or monitoring costs appear to be a good way 
to distinguish the deep-water, essentially common-property 
seedbeds from tidal-flat seedbeds, the riparian right claims to 
which are enforceable at less than prohibitive cost. 
2The probability of a successful set per free-swimming spat is a 
function of cultch height off the bottom, since larval-stage 
oysters (spats) die if the habitat in which they are forever 
cemented is invaded by shifting sand or mud. For a more 
extensive discussion, see VIMS, "Marine Resources Information 
Bulletin, July 29, 1974. 
3poRR replaces the shell taken out in the process of transplanting 
seed oysters in order to keep the cultch pile of constant height. 
4"seed producers" here refers to those engaged in harvesting 
operations whether by tongs, patent tongs, or dredge. 
5Rather than 126, there are "only" 85 observations in this 10-1/2. 
year time series as oysters are taken in only the first five and 
the last three months of each year. 
6In most fisheries, catch is constrained by legal limits. This 
artificial barrier to continuous marginal decision-making by the 
owner-entrepreneurs appears to be somewhat less effective in 
oystering. 
7The· documentation of data sources from which all variables in 2 .1 and 
2.2 were constructed appears in Appendix A. 
8As the offer prices being estimated are those of the planters-
harvesters for seed, we refer here to the production function of 
mature (shuck) oysters from seed, labor, capital equipment, etc. 
Seasonal phenomena affecting the production of seed oysters are 
reflected by the supply function's month dummies (see equation 
2.2). 
9we have great expectations, for example, as to the eventual 
applicability in such a model of periodic "spatfall on shell 
string" surveys by the Virginia Institute of Marine Science. At 
this juncture, however, that series is quite short and the data 
collection process is still evolving as VIMS (in collaboration 
with the VMRC) attempts to improve the reliability of spatfall 
counts as a measure of seed oyster setting and, thus, of 
"bioavailability". See Haven and Kendall, 1974, 1975, and 1976. 
lONormally, of course, one would explore the relevant theory and 
derive the implications of all explanatory variables included in 
one's specifications, but as the biological seasonality of the 
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oyster is quite technical and has no direct bearing on our 
benefit calculations, we leave that task to others more qualified 
in these matters. 
111n the physicist's sense, of course, all catastrophes, because they 
are, themselves, irreversible, are "natural". Nevertheless, one 
can be somewhat less deterministic about manmade events that 
precipitate long-term damage so mammoth they are immediately 
denoted "catastrophes". The Kepone catastrophe along the James 
River system presents a case in point. We think that disaster 
and the foregone benefits it destroyed can be evaluated by a 
variant of the present model. 
121n reality, the demand for Virginia seed oysters is also influenced 
by the scope of the VMRC's transplanting efforts on the public 
grounds. However, as the benefit of that in-kind subsidy is 
reflected by market value in the shuck oyster market, we ignored 
both the cost and the benefits of said program in this seed 
oyster study. 
13of course, changes in seed quantity supplied can also be induced 
by changes in the going price of seed oysters (that is, by demand 
shifts, and, thus, movements along--not shifts of--a given supply 
curve), so we include PsEED in equation 2.2. 
14other inputs may be extensively employed like lime for predator 
control but the principal remains the same--input prices must 
appear in equation 2.2. 
151n the entire eastern half of Virginia, the Federal Land Bank 
held less than half a dozen watermen loans in June 1977. 
16The only major exception is Northampton County where the recent 
emergence of manufacturing plants has introduced openings in 
unionized factory jobs. 
17"Mobile oystermen" was defined so as to exclude those boat owners 
and shore licensors making more than half of their income in 
oystering (thus, non-"casuals"), because we wished to distinguish 
the marginal labor decisions explored here from the marginal 
entrepreneurial decisions as to which fishery to work in a given 
month. The latter are discussed below. 
We ignored the 1975 employment data because Gloucester County 
plummeted from its roughly 30 percent trend down to 3 percent of 
"crewman and casuals," while Mathews and Northampton Counties 
doubled to 21 percent and 14 percent f~om respective trends of 10 
percent and 6 percent. The lack of a stable geographic 
dis•tribution of oyster employment is worrisome, but the usual 
criticism that these place of residence data should be replaced 
with the more relevant (but costly) place of work data (say, by 




Watermen, especially in eastern Gloucester County, are incredibly 
mobile in•following, indeed anticipating, movements in a fishery. 
But few would claim that close to 150 fishermen and their 
families actually moved in 1974-75 and returned to the marshes in 
1975-76. Instead, this aberrant 1975 licensing data reflects a 
very fundamental phenomenon in economic science--after a year in 
which the real price of crabs rose over 50 percent, the 
Gloucestermen simply failed to renew their oyster licenses in 
anticipation of another big year for crabs (see footnote 24). 
18our selection criterion in choosing these six counties and Newport 
News was legal jurisdictions, contiguous with water areas where 
seed oysters were taken in 1976, having more than 5 percent of 
the mobile oystermen in 1974-76. 
19see the Alternative Wage/Employment Opportunity Index for Virginia 
Seed Oyster Industry in Appendix B. 
20The skill distribution is seldom stable for long periods of time, 
.especially in construction where the peculiar requirements of 
each site may dominate. It is highly probably that much of the 
variability in the construction wage series reflects job or skill 
distribution changes. Otherwise, such wage differentials as are 
exhibited in Table 1 simply could not exist between contiguous 
counties (for example, between York and Gloucester). 
21In addition, of course, wage data do not convey the underemployment 
impact of cyclical phenomena, especially in the construction 
industry. Wage income data would be preferable. Finally, union 
rigidities in firings/layoffs and (to a lesser extent) the 
irregular and secondary worker phenomena will always conceal some 
of the changing employment opportunities that might be reflected 
by a truly equilibrium wage. 
22In constrast, of course, an additional engineer's wages influence 
the aggregated, average wage index more than do an additional 
laborer.'s. 
23This case is, however, exemplary of the great caution with which 
such wage data must be handled. In mid-1968, just the opposite 
scenario began--wages rose so less substitution not more might be 
expected, but this time there really was an aggregate demand 
increase in construction. Job openings as well as average wages 
rose and more watermen substituted towards the alternative 
employment opportunity, not less. 
24why cl~ms and crabs? For a start, patent clam and patent oyster 
tongs are essentially the same. Note that we include a post-1969 
surf clam price series as well as a full-length hard clam price 




crabbing operations as demonstrated by the great numbers making 
that transition in what is the summer off-season for oysters. 
The MRC has suggested that a finfish price series would likely be 
important here since the primary supply substitute, clams, is not 
evenly distributed across the geographic area in which oysters 
are landed. However, we remain uncertain as to which finfish to 
include (we know, for example, that oystermen sometimes crew on 
menhaden vessels in their May to December season) and note that 
crab potting presents the most universal substitute production 
opportunity. Indeed, we ranacross a massive example of that 
substitution from crabs to oysters and back again (by 69 
non-"casual" Gloustermen in 1974-76) as the once-lagged real 
(inflation-adjusted) crab price index fell from 1.0. to 0.78 and 
rose again to 1.18. 
25of course the regression coefficients (i.e., the Bs) are themselves 
signed. We have simply indicated the implied signs in Equs. 2.11 
and 2.12 with each coefficient appearing technically as its 
absolute value (e.g. Bf in Equ. 2.11 is actually Bf). 
26As is clear above, in the case of exact or over-identification, the 
2SLS and instrumental variable estimation methods are identical. 
27our discussion above has so myopically focused on supply only 
because the demand curve (equation 2.11) is identified by all 
manner of exclusively-supply shifters--Rt, CRPit, SCPit, At, etc. 
Of course, the generation of meaningful demand estimates is no 
less critical to our purpose. 
28T-scores for use in tests of statistical significance are in 
parentheses. Three asterisks at 95% and one at 90%. 
29For the derivation of demand and supply curves from these results, 
· see the section below entitled "Aggregate Benefit Estimates." 
30The R2 of .64 (measuring the "explanatory power" of the regression 
with a ratio of explained to total variation in the dependent 
variable) is a trifle low for non-individual data, but well 
within the range of published regression results on the final 
product, shuck oyster market. See Joseph J. Charbonneau and 
Richard Marasco, "A Positive Spatial Equilibrium Model of Oyster 
Markets: A Simultaneous Equations Approach," Agricultural 
Experiments Station, Univ. of Maryland, May, 1975. 
31The one substantive exception has been a gnawing concern that the 
demand function should "work" in log fo.rm and that ignoring this 
presupposition may result in misspecification error. The 
troublesome implication as to functional specification is all to 
easy to derive (in a variety of ways) from the definition of the 
offer price of an input as the value of the marginal product 




in this case, the log specification of 2.15 results in absolute 
nonsense, from the inexplicable positive signs of PsEED to the 
insignificance of everything other than dummy variables. 
A perusal of the residuals from equation 2.15, however, turned up 
no evidence of either heteroskedasticity or misspecification 
error. 
320ne-tailed hypothesis tests of B! (on PsEED are not quite as 
aHtomatic as the iron law of demand allows hypothesis tests of 
Bi to be~ but we have chosen to report on a one-tailed null 
(i.e., B1 = 0) and alternative (i.e., Bf> 0). 
33Alternatively, one might argue that watermen replace boats and 
equipment primarily through disaster-relief programs and that 
these subsidized funds cause capital costs to vary over time 
independently of interest rates. 
34see the 1970 summary issue of "Virginia Landings," NOAA-National 
Marine Fisheries Service, for an announcement of the surf clam's 
descent from Maryland waters. 
35without incorporating additional information (perhaps as to how 
one might better distinguish the two variables in questions by 
avoiding particular kinds of measurement errors), the only remedy 
for multicollinearity is to identify whichever of the collinear 
regressors better reflects the variability of interests, and 
leave the other out. 
36sam Baker has explored various ways one might measure this all-
important rate of decomposition, but as yet his methods have not 
been implemented. 
37No similar adjustment of the seed price coefficient is necessary 
because the multiple regression model generates "partials." That 
is, it holds all other variables provisionally constant and thus 
nets out all accessory influences while estimating the systematic 
relatio~ship between price and quantity in isolation, for 
example. 
38Recall that "consumer" benefits refers here in the case of an 
input, to producers of the final product, market oysters. 
39As is perhaps obvious, alternative specifications of the demand 
curve 2.18 as other than linear imply alternative formulas for 
gross "consumer" benefits (compare 2.19). However, in the 
present case, alternative specifications of demand were found to 
be inferior to the linear form. 
40Again, three asterisks refer to statistical significance at the 99% 
confidence level, two asterisks--the 95%--and one asterisk--the 
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90%. 
Note that the t-score on our all-important variable, PsEED, has 
been substantially improved from 1.29 to 2.37; much random 
variation has been removed as the diminished standard error 
indicates. 
41A11 figures shown are in deflated (1967) dollars. 
42Figures shown are in real, deflated (1967) dollars. 
43Predator control by continuous applications of lime does take 
place in other oyster fisheries, but not in the Chesapeake 
region. 
44shell planting costs are separated in the VMRC budget, but 
harvesting for transplanting is lumped with the line-item "Other 
Contractual Services." 
Alternatively, one can argue that the cost in 1975 goes toward 
harvesting the seed from which one calculates benefits in 1975, 
but also toward the planting of a 1976 seed crop. So the more 
sensible approach might be to discount not costs but benefits--in 
particular, the future benefits associated with next year's seed 
crop. But all these discounting methods require data on public 
planting versus harvesting, and that expenditure data are not 
available from the line-item budgets with which we have worked. 
45we reaggregated monthly Department of Commerce data to obtain the 
following fiscal year wholesale price index used as the implicit 
deflator throughout this study: 
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
.998 1.013 1.145 1.091 1.122 1.164 1.261 1.469 1.716 1.796 
46"shells" cost includes all seedbed-related culth costs--e.g., 
for the turning of beds, as well as for the delivered materials 
itself. 
47The issue at hand is clearly a matter of degree. Strictly, the 
above argument as to the non-marginality of essentially overhead 
expenses holds true only at or near the present level of 
appropriations. If the oyster subsidy programs were really 
radically reduced then some of these administrative and law 
enforcement expences would surely become relevant. There are, 
however, non-marginal and therefore our perspective "irrelevant" 
costs if only incremental budget changes are under consideration. 
48we have been unable to ascertain the budget of the Engineering 
Office, although descriptions of the duties of its small 
professional staff suggest that perhaps only a portion of its 
costs ought to be imputed to the repletion and replenishment 
programs themselves. Indeed, decreasing the cultch programs by 
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releasing more of the Baylor grounds to private leaseholders 
might act~ally increase the workload of the Engineering Office, 
not decrease it. 
49This particular benefit-cost ratio implicitly assumes that in the 
absence of public sector intervention (that is, in the absence of 
the oyster subsidies), soon no private output would be 
forthcoming. For the implications of an alternative assumption, 
see Technical Appendix A and Fred Harris' "On Estimating the 
Benefits of an In-Kind Subsidy Program: Replenishment and 
Repletion in the Virginia Seed Oyster Industry," manuscript, 
Williamsburg, Va., presented at the Virginia Economics 
Association Meetings, Richmond, March 30, 1978. 
50in this era of general revenue-sharing, state legislators may 
soon find the opportunity costs of such allocations non-zero, as 
the choices among federally-supported highway, hospital and 
seedbed funding are increasingly being returned to the states. 
51A11 figures are again expressed in real, deflated 1967 dollars. 
52Not aggregated to a precise fiscal year timing of outlays. 
53This result can be seen most easilty by noting that the hatched 
area DBG (the excess of market value AB over partial willingness 
to pay ADG) is greater than the remaining willingness to pay ADF. 
Thus, market value exceeds total willingness to pay! 
54while the VMRC purchases some seed on a regular basis, it was the 
unusually large, federally-funded buying that caused the 
anomalies of 1973. The much more frequent practice of simply 
transplanting public grounds seed from one spot to another fails 
to alter these aggregate, market demand and supply curves "at 
all." 
55A more easily comprehendible anomaly appears in the results for 
1967 and 1972 when harvesters' net income is negative. In that 
case, producer losses (versus "producer surpluses") were probably 
due to the lingering effects of MSX disease, although we do not 
have any historical time series reflecting the mid or early 
sixties and can not, therefore, confirm such a pattern of 
declining losses and increasing market viability. Nevertheless, 
the well-documented magnitude of this previous disaster suggests 
that is could well have been 1968 before seed 
cultivators/harvestors again crawled into the black. Again 
following Agnes, 'the net income of see~ producers was negative 
(see Table 8 for the year 1972 as well as the negative private 
rate of return for 1972 in Table 10), prior to the 30% increase 
in subsidies. 
56The B/C ratios in Table 11, as well as production indices (in the 
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VMRC's annual reports and the National Marine Fisheries bulletin 
"Virginia Landings") indicate that the industry had recovered 
from MSX and was viable in 1968-1972. 
57Recall that all B/C ratios and component series are in deflated, 
1976 dollars. 
58Notice that in a world of scarce resources, tradeoffs must 
frequently be made and therefore a benefit-cost ratio greater 
than 1.0 does not, by itself, indicate that a program should be 
funded. We may, that is, forego a positive rate of return (on 
the tunnel, say) in order to maximize the return on our 
investment of state funds (with the bridge). 
59Among non-mutually exclusive projects, the only exception occurs 
when allocative choice involves programs which entail discrete 
lumpy investements--say a vessel acquisition, a building 
construction and a microwave tower installation. In that case, 
if the respective benefit-cost ratios were 2.3, 1.7 and 1.3, then 
one must rank entire projects since, in fact, one-third of a 
vessel or tower has no functional meaning. 
60Notice that we are assuming constant costs across the various 
seedbeds. 
6lrn order to account for the differential transportation costs of 
shells delivered to Tangier Bay vs. the lower James, we would 
simply replace the site-specific allocative criterion above 
(i.e., equate the marginal benefits) with the more general 
proposition--equate the ratio of marginal benefits to marginal 
costs (MBTB/MBJR = MCTB/MCJR)• Rearranging, we could then claim 
that the marginal benefit of a dollar's expenditure in Tangier 
Bay was equal to the MB of a dollar's expenditure in the lower 
James (i.e., MBTB/MCTB = MBJR/MCJR)• 
62To date we have been unable to verify a claim that 65 percent of 
the catch attributed to Maryland is actually imported from 
Virginia. Obviously, a transfer of that magnitude would 
significantly improve Virginia's catch statistics and might 
substantially offset the precipitous fall of recent decades. 
63For further details, amplification of the major findings and 
additional qualifications, see the separate tables and 
su~rounding text. 
64other less commensurable benefits of the oyster subsidies have 
been posed at times as rationales for the programs. We have not 
doub.t that the gradual assimilation of a subsistence-level 
socio-economic subculture into the more prosperous, wider society 
has been enhanced by the subsidies. Nevertheless, it has been 
beyond the scope of the present study to try to specify and 
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valuate these secondary benefits in any precise manner. Further, 
there was a time when the VMRC's regulatory policies met a 
sometimes-stated, sometimes-implicit objective of maximizing the 
employment opportunities within the oyster harvesting, processing 
and retailing industry as a whole. While these secondary 
benefits may have been substantial (with two or three jobs 
generally credited beyond the raw production sector), such 
arguments provide no additional rationale for oyster 
appropriations. Indeed, almost all potential state investments 
have these same "multiplier effects" on both expenditures and 
jobs. 
65For example, we remain unable to resolve the apparent inconsistency 
between two frequently encountered statements about the more 
radical of these regulation repeal proposals--namely, (1) 
"dredging destroys the natural bottom" and (2) "one of the best 
ways to renew a currently unproductive bed is to turn over the 
seedbed with a dredge." 
66The maximum employment objective itself may soon be questioned 
in light of the imminence of an automated shucking device. 
67The presently unpublished note has been submitted to the 
American Economic Review. 
68The framework of the analysis is that of a replenishable resource 
with significant public good characteristics, say an ocean 
fishery. Two additional restrictions appear useful to the simple 
manipulation of the analysis: first that the replenishment 
activity be of a continuous variety. While threshold 
replenishment systems seem to be more prevalent in nature, the 
model is always determinate and of more general applicability in 
its present continuous form (e.g., the skill training of some 
workers is a continuous replenishment activity with significant 
public good characteristics). And second, for the purposes of 
the present analysis, further simplifications can be obtained by 
assuming that the only input necessary for the production of 
replen~shment is a reduction of harvesting (more generally, a 
reduction of production). The crucial elements of the model can 
be identified then as the intertemporal nature of the production 
decision and the attenuation of the rights structure associated 
with the replenishment activity. As such, the externality in 
question consists of current over-production leading to a 
reduction in the net present value of each firm in the industry. 
69clearly, the finality of this intertemporal perspective suggests 
extremely powerful forces operating towards coalition or 
cooperation. However, the voluntary private bargaining 
implication suggested by any such potentially Pareto relevant, 
mutual gains from trade is here shortcircuite·d. We have 
encountered an externality the transaction costs of which are 
-69-
such that it can not be optimally abated by any rights 
reassignment short of monopoly creation. 
70oepending on the optimal cultch pile height in various bottom 
environments, the start-up (or "fixed") costs of establishing a 
productive seedbed could be large enough to extend the investment 
cycle beyond the first two years, but not plausibly far beyond. 
Further VIMS research could, of course, establish otherwise. At 
the moment, however, oyster market decision-making appears to be 
in marked contrast to, say, timber management where the payoff 
from a resource monopolist's optimal replenishment is many 
decades hence. 
71For further amplification, see F. H. deB. Harris, "A Competitive 
Model of Oyster Seedbed Leasing," unpublished manuscript proposed 
for delivery at the Richmond Meetings of the Virginia Economics 
Association, Spring 1978. 
72In the economist sense employed here, "welfare gains" do not 
include the market value of the seed oysters OABQ as a net 
benefit (or the private cost OBQ) because indeed there was an 
even exchange; the planter buyers gave up spending power on 
alternative goods and services in an amount just equal to the 
going market value of the seed received. Only the net income 
realized by producers from that exchange (i.e., OABQ-COSTS of OBQ 
= NET INCOME OAB) is counted as welfare gain. In addition, of 
course, total "welfare gain" includes the net benefit to 
consumers. 
73For further development of this conclusion, see Fred Harris, "On 
Estimating the Benefits of an In-Kind Subsidy Program: Repletion 
and Replenishment in the Virginia Seed Oyster Industry," 
manuscript, Williamsburg, Va., presented at the Virginia 
Economics Association Meetings, Richmond, March 30, 1978. 
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APPENDIX A: DATA 
All figures are listed in price-deflated (1967) dollars. To 
obtain nominal, raw data multiply by the fiscal year price deflator 




Production Production .Value Value 
Month No. Seed Shuck Seed Shuck WPI 
,Ian· 1 1966 310.31 5139 7 32619 172589 99 8 
2 15113 59 368 15 38 0 214 32 7 986 
- 3 ·225391 60869 212954 2 306 51 99 3 
4 22.7183 4lf 3 31 249140 132 349 99 3 
5 78274 33733 111015 114108 994 
.6 207765 5.3509 240510 194 4.3 7 1001 
7 158345 59019 116965 163061 99 8 
8 5o9io 3lt 5 72 516lf 1 96205 998 
9 23845 32786. 21¼206 88966 1001 
10. 20190 13762 20 091 38914 999 
11 42973 9900 59.3119 35114 996 
12 216453 326 2 244050 1139 5 99 2 
13 9 78 39 20045 146758 86 39 99 7 
14 114768 If 84 36 1309 50 167405 .. 100-1 
15 151910 37742 163469 121547 1001 
16 69927 32 8 !,E 78569 104435 1008 
17 24120 29 799 26340 .9 36 9 6 1011 
18 369 52 340 57 51843 112720 . 1019 
19 60730 3024.Ei 97838 99958 1021 · 
20 224121 23409 274565 60942 1021 
66461 26Lf 51 115.884 6 74 50 1 Q 2lf 
22 162548 48711 237222 154120 1029 
23 104350 48462 134729 149722 1033 
24 20853 387Lrn 2701~ 12 812 4 1036 
25 10858 25600 13843 7280·4 104 3 
26 24 79 2 18882 32171 51412· 1048 
27 39 339 19 38 0 58150 51¼7 6 7 1054 
28 14 26 8 0 15159 :178492 38 39 3 1055 
29 81684 126.4 3 124833 31764 106 3 
30 34900 47782 58156 144171 10'74 
31 8252lf 4134 3 110088 121932 1081. 
32 25617 3621 If 26168 10999 7 1086 
33 11708 20004 10 344 59391 1093 
34 22467 21797 23812 67248 1097 
35 1506 52 21016 172704 68 740 1099 
36 83421 4009 151030 11010 1100 
37 776.81 22 155362 60 1100 
38 136962 66860 . 205280 195277 1109 
39 74 5 52 5706 0 106760 185292 1109 
40 31174 546 3lt 42554 179 0 7 5 1110. 
. .'41 16 589 20876 20043 8 06 82 1118 
42 11423 35171 12 5~4 118494 112 8 
4-3 , 28774 30249 3tr492 90770 1130 
44 207330 9555 245976 34130 1133 I us 83077 6596 140699 22131 1138 
... ·-··- .... ~-. ... ·. 1 -:• .. , 
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1 
Production Production Value Value 
Month No. Seed Shuck Seed Shuck WPI 
4 6. - . . .. - .. 8 2 6 5 5 -- . . 66°912 155990 258429 1146 
47 78788 51536 134186 192774 114 5 
48 33157 57646 51640 2 01106 4 11°54 
49 26609 389 01 27261. 119014 1163 
50 2 e·222 27114 38 738 8 84 5 5 1173 
51 48159 16441 71451 62592 1174 
52 17006_2 580 ·118250 1966 1175 
53 64624 1111 143594 3754 118 2 
54 62787 27586 123509 137481 1200 
55 648St1 32896 121831 138914 1207 
56 399 06 32 8 73 94691 142168 1229 
57 4 5661 30574 82270 140132 124 5 
58 29 399 17544 52132 68640 1269 
59 81019. 11786 117712 56044 1298 
60 58134 1}29 7 110 22.5 16662 130 5 
61 58376 352 146057 16 38 1332 . 
62 7626 7 57699 1511176 216062 1387 
63 7.6 08 3 96089 138255 378666 13<)2 
64 34016 67883 63012 245368 1418 
65 42566. 78155 78202 288598 1466 
66 31501 110 7 8 3 59 256 155416 -149 5 
67 47226 23175 104057 10 3134 1514 
68· 11888 9024 299?.57 386t10 1527 
69 101278 1696 289437 7614 1550 
70 6 3209 95888 133292 407323 1702 
71 42928 89 439 67465 427171 1719 
72 40701 616 5 3 71242 353822 1715 
73 45735 60299 78458 30 04ll 3 1718 
-7 4 9109 539 35 14140 2111119 1713 
75 2 3917 37147 41118 8 157418 1 7 Oll 
76 9118 2 3 5376 170012 19319 1721 
77 59048 1 113880 0.001 1732 
78 121832 89 017 205131 483415 1789 
79 859 77 76 739 150070 432384 1782 
80 25716 79 5 39. 39 7.64 .4 5 2 2 0 5 .1787 
81 2153 73549 2 560 413543 1793 
82 -37 3 33 50801 68738 325902 179 3 
83 42072 27564 81686 16969 7 1796 
84 12:1933 1 2312011 0.001 1813 
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Month '67 '68 '69 '70 '71 '72 '73 '74 '75 '76 Feb Mat Apr May Oct Nov Dec 
4 •. 71 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 -0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
5.71 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 . .o o. 0 
10.71 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
11.71 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 b 0 ·o 0 0 0 1 0 
12.71 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
· 1. 72 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.72 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 .0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.72 0 0 0 b 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 o. 0 0 
4.72 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 -0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
5.72 0 0 0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
10.72 0 b 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
11.72 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
12.72 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 o· o· 0 0 0 0 1 
1. 73 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 o. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.73 0 0 0 0 0 ·o 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.73 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
4.73 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 -0 0 0 0 
5.73 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
10.73 0 0 o. 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
11.73 ·O 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
u,· 
I 12 • 7 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1.74 0 0 -0 ·O -0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.74 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.74 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0: 0 1 0 0 o· 0 0 
4.74 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
5.74 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 -0 0 0 . 1 0 0 0 
10.74 0 0 0 ·o () 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
11. 74 0 0- 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
12.74 0 0 0 0 .Q 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1. 7 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.75 0 -0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 o· ·1 0 o· 0 n 0 
· 4. 7 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
5.75 0 0 O· 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
10.75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1· 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
11. 7 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
12. 7 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 o· 1 
1. 76 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.76 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 .o 0 0 
3.76 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 d 0 0 0 
4.76 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 ·1 0 0 0 0 ·1 
5. 7 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0-- ---£_ 0 1 0 0 0 
l_te..:i-C:•:, 
Surf 
Seafood· Crab Clam Clam 
Year Price Price Price Price 
Month Index Index Index Index 
'-. 
.1'.66 100.2 4.437 450.9 0 I 
2.66 88.88 5·. P. 3 9 6 34. 9 0 
3.66 66.33 6. 7 34 526. 7 0 
4. 66 24.69 6. 491 513. 6 0 
5.66 18, 3 6.79 508 0 
10. 66" ·1 7. 91 4.733 608.4 0 
11.66 15.82 4.502 6 31. 3 0 
12.66 6 3. 9 3 4.231 638.3 0 
1.67 73,24 4·. 2_3 7 604.4 0 
2.$7 8 3. 61. 5.561 59 7. 6 0 
3.67 56. 14 7. 66 · 606.4 0 
4.67 24.7 5.229 602.8 0 
5.67 .1 7. 31 4.902 558.7 0 
10.67 23.31 6.112 52 8. 5 0 
i-1. 6 7 18. 48 6. 5 56 585.4 0 
12.67 93.3 S.455 5 79. 4 0 
1. 68 91.37 .6. 46 5 5 51 •· 9 0 
2.68 108.4 8.233 566. 2 0 
3. 68 72.72 15.57 5 59. 3 0 
4.68 2 0. 46 13.81 492.7 0 
5.G8 23.7 12.17 49·7. 1 0 
10.68 14. 96 8.862 601. 6 0 
11.68 23.58 8.861 6 08. 9 0 
i2.68 99."75 8. 29 5 59 6. 5 0 
1.69 119.8 16. 2 3 61 7. 4 b 
2. 6-9 116 '.1,5.97 59 0. 6 0 
3,69 80,17 22.29 59 9 .• 6 112 
4,69 20.39 15,07 54 3. 1 106.2 
5,69 17.85 23,()1 52 7. 8 10 5 • !~ 
10.69 16.29 · 4. 96 5 8 8 .• 5 0 
11.69 36. 9 2 4.614 5_81. 9 0 
12. 69 87.72 4,1;18 589. 3 b 
1. 7 99.66 4,571 640,4 ·O 
2. 7 9 4. 54 · 4. 5 39 6 50. 9 0 
3.7 72.59 4. 5 5 5 72. 3 100.1 
4.7 '19.17 4,502 572,7 111. 8 
5. 7 12.19 4,62 570,'1 118.?. 
10,7 16. 54 s:109 622.2 117.2 
11.7 19, 3 3 7,148 6 04. 1 11·7. 2 
12.7 87.09 6.272 58 4. 7 134.2 
1. 71 110.2 10.58 619 14 3. 1 
2.71 97.98 8.222 6 21 i 5 11+ 1·. e 
\ 3. 71 6G.73 12,31 fi 5 3. :1 '33. P.:I 
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Surf 
Seafood Crab Clam Clam 
Year Price Price Price Price 
Month Index Index Index Index 
... 4-. 71 29.25 4,929 6 5.6. 7 . · ee. 26 
5.71 21. 4 7.596 703,9 87.87 
10.71 14. 32 5.136 608,2 89~88. 
11. 71 13.27 5.88 710 95.2 
12. 71 6 7. 99 5,29 69 5 94.45 
1.72 71. 28 6,983 6 9 5. 6 9 6. 3 
2.72 82,14 9.677 719. 5 95,48 
3.72 77.61 9,094 .691.7 80.92 .. 
4.72 ·38. 78 6,734 720 89~36 
5.72 24.09 . 5. 944 703.9 9 3. Oq 
10.72 10.61 7.119 752.5 90.83 
11.72 13.37 7.97. 786.2 90,31 
12.72 35.54 6 • 1)9 9 752.6 91. 13 
1 •. 7 3 63.24 11.44 714.1 87.55 
2.73 70,92 13,89 687.2 8 5. 89 
3.73 58. 5 7 14.95 717,3 83.2 
4.73 39. 76 13.86 710.3 .87.36 
5. 7 3 29.23 12. 06 701.2 84,0R 
10.73 21.5 5. 96 7 675.6 80.03 
11. 7 3 20.33 6,097 6 76 81.1P. 
12.73 23.05 7.17 6 6 5. 7 77.57 
1.74 58.29 8. 1,3 3 620.1 81. 17 
·2. 7 4 . 59. 4 7 9. 26 4 533.8 84.?8 
3,74 50,3 9. 5 79 616.9 7 5. 3 
4.74 .3 6 • 81 7,737 613 69.42 
5.74 2 3. 49 7.412 6 04. 5 81. 29 
10.74 21. 01 5,609 576, 4 76. 6 
11. 7 l~ 18.02 5·. 8 s 561. 4 74. 3 
12.74 31,48 5. 76 7 546,9 7 8. 5 5 
1. 75 .6 2. 68 . 8,306 5 33. 6 83.28 
2.75 54, 91 10 I en 532. 5 85.09 
3. 7 5 50 • 4n 13.54 552.9 98.63 
4.75 37.78 12.27 54 5 I 9 102.1 
5. 7 5 25 11. 39 545.9 ,12 8. 5 
10.75 ·31.07 6.891 52 5. 1 161. 3 
11. 7 5 43,77 8. 134 2 5 30. 7 23·1. 1 
12.75 5 7. 56 8.774 530,2 231. 2 
1. 76 -90.55 12, 72 526.7 '256.9 
2.76 116. ~. 13.5 53·0, 3 297 
3.76 9 .-49 14,42 52 2. 5 32 7. 6 
4.76 47.48 12.52 526.6 324.4 




Alternative Employment Opportunity Index 
for Virginia Seed Oyster Industry 
c' )>!:;·: 
Month.Year 
1. 66 263;1 4.71 341, 
2. 66 2 59. 1 5.71 36 1. 2 
3.66 284.8 '.l.0.71 36 3. 3 
4. 66 300.5 11. 71 373.9 
5. 66 332 12.71 359, 3 
10.66 2·99. 6 1. 72 376. 9 
11.66 29f3. 2 2. 72 38 7. '.I 
12.66 286.6 3.72 39 8. 9 
1. 67 249,7 4~72 416.7 
2,67 24'),1· 5. 72 426.7 
3, 67 259.2 10,72 456.7 
4. C 7 281.7 1L 72 454~3 
5. 6 7 290.9 12. 72 4 5?.. 4 
10. 67 299,4 1. 73 4 0 :I , Lt 
11. 67 286,5 2.73 410.7 
12. 6 7 26 4. 1 3. 7 3 420.9 
1. 68 305,8 4. 7 3 . 451.7 
2. 68 322,8 5. 7 3 4 7 4, I+ 
3. 68 339,4 10,73 !",07,? 
·4,58 .28 8. 6 11. 73 lt9 5, 4 
5, GB 302,9 12.73 483.9 
10,68 32 lt, 4 1. 74 46 3. 11 
11. 68 31 3. 6 2,74 1+6 2, 1 
12.68 3.1 O, 6 3,74 475.9 
1. 69 332~5 4,74 469.8 
2. 69 3~8.2 5.74 48 3, Lt 
3.69 336.7 10.74 116 6, 3 
4,G<J 355 11. 7 IJ. 45 4, f. 
5,69 355.4 1?. • 7 4 437,4 
10.69 336.7 1. 7 5 394.P 
11. 69 32 7. 4 2. 7 5 384.7 
12, 69 31 7. 5 3. 7 5 3P. :!.. 
1.7 289.6 4,75 408.9 
2. 7 300.1 5. 7 5 4 08. 5 
4 • 
3.7 311. 2 10,75 404,2 .. . 7 11. 7 5 39 3. 1 3311. 6 
5. 7 353,2 12.75 39 2. 2 
10,7 3 54, I+ 1. 76 3fi5.6 
11. 7. 358,2 2,76 368,1 
12.7 3 56. 2 3.76 372~8 
1. 71 326. 6 4·, 76 396. 8 
2,71 32 3. 9 5. 76 417.1 





TECHNICAL APPE~DIX A 
In the foregoing benefit-cost analysis, we have assumed that in 
the absence of subsidized culch the private seed oyster industry would 
quickly go under. An alternative assumption as to the 
self-sufficiency of the private industry might lead to the following 













Does the enlarged consumers surplus triangle ABC (see Figure 14) 
plus the enlarged producers surplus triangle OAB delineate a 
sufficient increase in net benefits to justify that subsidy ODEB 
responsible for the reduction in price and increase in output? 
Figure 14 
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For this to be so, an appr.opriate benefit-cost ratio, defined as 
the change in aggregate net benefits [(ABC-FGC) + (OAB-DGF)] to public 
cost (ODEB), must be greater than one:72 
ALTERNATIVE BENEFIT/STATE COST RATIO~ [(ABC-FGC) + (OAB-DGF)]/ODEB 
We include in the numerator only the increase in net benefits to 
tongers and planters·because to do otherwise (to attribute the entire 
net income OAB, plus the entire consumer surplus ABC, to the subsidy 
programs) would imply that in the absence of public intervention, no 
private output would be forthcoming. But of course, that is not the 
case (as depicted by the positive and substantial private market 
output, MKTQEQPRIVATE in Figure 15). Thus, we might have calculated 
(ABGF = ABHI)/ODEB for each fiscal year and reported alternative 
reflections of that same information as public and private rates of 
return. 
The calculations entailed by adopting this more sophisticated 
benefit measure (the tetrahedron ABGF + ABHI, that is, FGBHI) are not 
different in kind from those explained in great detail in Chapter 2, 
but they are considerably more complicated. Before integrating under 
.. , 
the demand function (Q = aD + BDPseed) from, say, PPRIVATE to 
PsuBSIDIZED, it was necessary to establish what the equilibrium 
private-market price would have been in the absence o.f the subsidies. 
Assuming a unit subsidy, we simply subtracted the appropriate 
subsidy from the estimated supply function (see Figure 14) to obtain 
the free-market, unsubsidized supply, 
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QPRIVATE = (aS + UNIT SUBSIDY)+ BS PsEED• 
Then setting private supply equal to estimated demand, 
[aS + UNIT SUBSIDY)+ BS PsEEDl = [aD + B PsEEDl 
it was possible to solve for the private market-clearing price. 
Various integrations involving this and the subsidized price (for 
example, 
NET CONSUMER 
BENEFIT, ABGF = 
p 
J PRIVATE (aD+BD p ) dP = 
PSUBSIDIZED SEED 
where A= (PpRr-PsuB), brought us eventually to the area of FGBHI, the 
net benefit measure of interest. Calculations for the most recent 
years 1974-76 confirmed our suspicion that these benefit meausures 
would be smaller than those reported in the text (see Tables 12 and 
13) _73 
We have chosen to report the larger benefit-cost ratios primarily 
because we believe that the public subsidies have been critical to the 
survival of the seed oyster industry in recent decades. That is, the 
devastations_ precipitated by both MSX and Agnes were, arguably, of 
sufficient scope that the industry might have never recovered without 
public subsidies. Only a thorough-going simulation analysis can 
confirm this presupposition, but it will remain our operative 
assumption until prove~ otherwise. 
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